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In the midst of the Great Recession, cities across the country were impacted in a 
variety of ways, and most saw rapid increases in foreclosures. This report uses a 
conceptual framework composed of three elements, stressors, vulnerability, and 
resiliency, to look at the implications of foreclosures for cities. First, factors that cause 
foreclosures in the 100 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas are examined. Then this 
report looks specifically at the economic impact of foreclosures. Using multiple 
regression analyses, the findings suggest that foreclosures have negative economic 
impacts and can be considered a stressor on a city’s economy. The application of this 
stressor has implications for a city’s vulnerability and resiliency. To some extent, local 
authorities have limited authority and capacity to prevent foreclosures. Therefore, this 
report also explores alternative approaches that cities can take to increase economic 
resiliency and competitiveness in the context of stressors such as foreclosures.  
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Chapter 1: Cities and the Housing Market 
Between December 2007 and June 2009, the United States entered an economic 
downturn known to some as the Great Recession. Unlike prior recessions, the Great 
Recession was more severe and its implications were more widespread and damaging.1 
Unemployment rates soared, the financial sector collapsed, consumer spending and 
confidence plummeted, and with the collapse of the housing market, many families lost 
their homes. The collapse of the housing sector had ripple effects in the economy, and 
one of the goals of this report is to understand how foreclosures impacted the economy of 
cities.  
Cities are particularly important because they are critical drivers of economic 
growth, and are also closely linked to national economies. In addition to providing a 
variety of public services, cities are responsible for a disproportionately large share of 
economic production. In 2012, for instance, a mere 19 percent of the global population 
lived the largest 300 metropolitan economies.2 But these 300 metropolitan economies 
produced 48 percent of global GDP.3 In this country, McKinsey & Company estimates 
that in 2010, nearly 85 percent of GDP was generated in 259 large cities across the U.S.4 
Furthermore, in some states, cities account for the majority of economic output.5  
Boston, MA is one such example. Its economy is driven by an abundance of 
universities, a large tourism sector, and numerous medical facilities. The technology 
sector also has a large presence, partly due to the concentration of universities in the area. 
These sectors are sources of economic growth and employment, and it is not uncommon 
for people from the neighboring state of New Hampshire to commute to Boston for 
employment opportunities, indicating that the city and the economic opportunities it 
provides are vital to the surrounding region.  
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Given the economic importance of cities, it is important to understand how they 
fare when they experience an economic jolt. In the aftermath of the Great Recession and 
the collapse of the housing industry, cities across the country saw increasing foreclosures. 
States such as Florida, Arizona, and California were among the most severely impacted, 
and cities and neighborhoods that once thrived were no longer vibrant communities. 
Instead, houses were boarded up and vacated. Across the country, these properties were 
not maintained, and neighborhoods and cities began to decline. Entire neighborhoods 
became “ghost subdivisions,” a term referring to abandoned, deserted neighborhoods 
filled with underwater or foreclosed homes.6  
This chapter has three primary goals. First, an analytical framework will be 
developed. Next, a brief history of U.S. housing policy will be presented. This chapter 
concludes with an overview of the structure used in the rest of the report.  
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: STRESSORS, VULNERABILITY, AND RESILIENCY 
This report examines the economic impact of foreclosures in cities across the 
country, which can be explored using the closely related concepts of stressors, resiliency, 
and vulnerability. Times of crisis and economic instability make traditional urban 
economic frameworks less applicable. Thus, while this conceptual framework is not 
typically used in urban economics, it is illuminating because these three concepts allow 
us to consider how a city reacts, responds to, and recovers from an economic jolt. 
In this report, an economic jolt such as a foreclosure can be considered a stressor 
on a city’s economy. This concept of a stressor originates in the field of criminology and 
can be defined as “a sudden change in circumstances or environment that interacts with a 
complicated psychological profile in a way that leads a previously quiescent person to 
become violent.”7 Stressors do not by themselves cause crimes, but instead are one of a 
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multitude of important factors.8 A foreclosure can be considered a stressor because a 
city’s economy is a complicated entity with many different forces at work. Political, 
economic, social, and environmental decisions will all have impacts on a city’s economy, 
and these forces interact in complex ways. Acting alone, a foreclosure may not have a 
significant economic impact. But when urban economies are already strained by an 
economic downturn, the impacts of a foreclosure may be more acute.  
In the literature, vulnerability has been defined as “the exposure of an economy to 
exogenous shocks.”9 Vulnerability is based on the economic conditions within a city, and 
increased vulnerability can interrupt and prevent economic growth in cities. For the 
purposes of this report, vulnerability can be considered the degree to which a city is 
exposed to economic stressors. A city that is highly vulnerable may have difficulty 
recovering from a stressor, and the concept of resiliency focuses on this recovery.  
 The concept of resiliency originated in environmental fields, and refers to the 
ability to change and thrive in the face of unfavorable environmental conditions.10 In an 
article titled Resilience and Regions: Building Understanding of the Metaphor, the 
authors discuss a few themes to clarify the term resiliency. First, the idea of an 
equilibrium is identified, referring to the concept that a system either has or lacks the 
ability to return to a pre-shock state.11 Another important part of resilience is path 
dependence, meaning that a series of decisions, made over an extended period of time, 
tend to force a system down a certain path, and as a result, the system’s future can be 
more predictable.12 Resiliency therefore explores how a city’s economy responds to an 
economic stressor. A resilient and sustainable city will be able to withstand the impact of 
a stressor. When a resilient city is unable to avoid the impact of a stressor, it will at least 
be able to recover more quickly.  
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There are many types of stressors, and in the modern economy, a foreclosure may 
be considered an economic stressor. Introducing and applying a stressor can potentially 
place downward economic pressure on cities, and the application of a stressor may result 
in increased vulnerability and decreased resiliency. How do cities respond to the 
application of a stressor? This response has implications for economic resiliency and 
competitiveness. Ideally, a city is resilient enough to rapidly recover from or withstand 
stressors. This level of resiliency can promote long-term economic stability.     
A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. HOUSING POLICY 
The Great Depression can be considered an example of an extreme stressor. There 
were a variety of forces at work that contributed to the depression, such as the 1929 stock 
market crash, the failure of banks and the resulting loss of savings, and protectionist 
public policies. These forces interacted in complex ways with one another, and because 
U.S. economy was vulnerable to these forces, the country entered a severe economic 
downturn. Resiliency was also lacking, as evidenced by the prolonged duration of the 
Great Depression. It was not until President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and the U.S. 
entry into World War II that the economy fully recovered. 
Initial federal government forays into housing policy began with the onset of the 
depression, and the collapse of the housing market. Before this time, mortgages and the 
housing sector were generally under the purview of private markets.13  But by 1933, some 
estimates suggest that there were over 1,000 foreclosures per day.14 The rapidly 
increasing foreclosure rate resulted in market failures across the housing market, the 
financial market, and the economy in general.  
To address this market failure, the federal government created the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA).15 While its role has changed over the twentieth century, 
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the FHA was originally created to restore confidence in mortgage lending by insuring 
mortgages.16 A variety of other federal initiatives, such as the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, and the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation were also created during this time period.17 The 
goals of these programs were to make the housing market more dependable and resilient, 
and they also provided support for the construction and real estate industries.18 By 
providing support for the construction industry and stabilizing the housing market, 
federal officials hoped to spur economic recovery.19 
A significant piece of federal legislation was the 1949 Housing Act, which aimed 
to provide adequate housing for the entire US population. It also contained provisions to 
support urban redevelopment initiatives and bolster existing housing programs.20 The 
theme of expanding homeownership is one that continues to resonate throughout the 
history of American housing policy. In 1969, the Fair Housing Act was passed, which 
attempted to deal with discrimination in the housing market by making it illegal to deny 
housing on the basis of race, religion, or ethnicity.21  
In 1977, the Community Reinvestment Act was passed in an attempt to reduce 
red-lining. The act encouraged financial institutions to serve their entire communities, 
including low-income areas.22 This was a problem in Atlanta, GA, and many other cities 
across the country, where banks displayed discriminatory lending practices by making 
lending decisions on the basis of race. Banks were more likely to reject loan applications 
from African Americans, and were less likely to approve African American mortgage 
applications when the applicants were considering home purchases in predominately 
white neighborhoods.23 To some extent, all of these laws experienced inadequate 
enforcement, but they had the overall effect of expanding access to mortgage credit.24 
Expanding access to mortgage credit allowed more people to purchase homes. But as will 
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be discussed in more detail later, expanding credit access also means that lending criteria 
was relaxed.  
Prior to the 1980s, states had some regulatory authority for mortgages and other 
financial instruments. During the 1980s, as increasing numbers of savings and loans 
corporations went bankrupt, the federal government preempted state regulatory 
authority.25 Ultimately, this lead to the nationalization of housing finance, and the power 
of state governments was curtailed. But the regulatory structure at the federal level was 
inadequate, and coupled with weakening state regulatory mechanisms, the volume of 
subprime mortgages grew dramatically.26 As will be explored later, subprime loans have 
a higher probability of foreclosure, and may be a source of vulnerability for cities.  
The Clinton administration played a significant role in expanding home 
ownership by establishing a goal of achieving a 67.5 percent national homeownership 
rate by 2000.27 The Clinton administration strategy did not require new legislation or 
initiatives, but instead relied on encouraging homeownership in groups with traditionally 
low homeownership rates, and also by more aggressively enforcing existing housing and 
banking laws.28 The details of the Clinton administration’s plans were presented in the 
National Homeownership Strategy. This policy initiative suggested a partnership between 
governments of all levels, private actors, nonprofits, and community groups.29 Critical 
elements of the strategy address housing financing, production, building communities, 
opening markets, homeownership education and counseling, and raising awareness.30 The 
Clinton administration achieved its goal, and the Bush administration also encouraged 
homeownership by directing the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to 
focus its efforts specifically on low income and minority groups.31 
One of the main reasons that the federal government promotes homeownership is 
because it is a method of wealth accumulation. Even if housing prices are in decline, a 
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homeowner who is making regular mortgage payments will pay down their mortgage and 
build equity.32 The federal government encourages homeownership through the home 
mortgage interest deduction, and homeowners receive tax deductions based on the size of 
their house.33  
The emphasis on homeownership encouraged the proliferation of subprime 
mortgages. Some federal initiatives emphasized homeownership specifically for low 
income and minority groups. In some instances, these borrowers were unable to meet the 
qualifications for prime mortgages, and lenders resorted to subprime mortgages instead. 
As will be discussed in more detail later, subprime mortgages, which can increase a city’s 
vulnerability, have a higher likelihood of resulting in foreclosures. By early 2006, as the 
housing market began to decline, many state and local markets saw marked increases the 
amount of subprime foreclosures, although this timeline changes slightly depending on a 
city’s age.34 By the middle of 2007, most cities across the US were experiencing 
increasing foreclosures and mortgage delinquencies.35 This accumulation, which may 
decrease a city’s resiliency, was exacerbated by the onset of the Great Recession in 
December 2007. 
A foreclosure occurs when a homeowner falls behind on mortgage payments. 
After 90 days without receiving a payment, the mortgage is considered seriously 
delinquent, at which point the lender typically initiates the foreclosure process.36 The 
specific foreclosures process is determined by state law. There are two main foreclosure 
processes. Judicial foreclosures occur when a foreclosure is adjudicated through the court 
system.37 Statutory foreclosures occur when the foreclosed property is auctioned off at 
the lender’s discretion.38 On average, researchers have found that judicial foreclosures 
take five months longer than statutory foreclosures.39 In some states, the foreclosure 
process entails a final step, known as the post-sale redemption. This is the final 
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opportunity for homeowners to avoid a foreclosure, and the sale of the house to another 
party is conditional on the failure of this final step.40   
THE CAUSES OF FORECLOSURES  
Numerous studies have explored factors that contribute to foreclosures, and the 
research points to three main explanations: decreasing housing prices, weak regional 
economies, and increasing percentages of new, yet risky, financial instruments used to 
finance home purchases.41 The majority of the research analyzes foreclosures at either the 
state or city level; in general, there are few studies addressing foreclosures at the national 
level.  
In Massachusetts, there was a large increase of foreclosures in 2006 and 2007, 
which researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank in Boston attribute to the 2005 decline in 
housing prices.42 They find that houses whose prices decline by 20 percent or more are 14 
times more likely to default on a mortgage compared to houses whose value increased by 
20 percent or more.43 The relationship between housing value and the probability of 
defaulting has been confirmed by other studies. These findings suggest that perhaps 
foreclosures act as a stressor on housing values, and with the application of this stressor, 
cities face vulnerabilities such as declining home values.  
Weak regional economies contribute to foreclosures, and studies have shown a 
statistically significant relationship between unemployment rates and foreclosure rates.44 
This finding supports the claim that foreclosures can negatively impact the economy, and 
also provides support for the theory of foreclosures as an economic stressor. However, to 
some extent the relation between unemployment rates and foreclosures depends on the 
type of MSA being examined. Cities with traditionally weak markets, (measured by 
unemployment rates) such as Detroit, MI and Indianapolis, IN, tend to experience higher 
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foreclosure rates.45 High unemployment rates might possibly be a vulnerability that 
makes cities more susceptible to increased foreclosure rates. But it is possible that 
foreclosures might contribute to high unemployment rates (used as a measure of 
economic vitality), and the economic health regression model presented in Chapter 5 
addresses the nature of the relation between the economy and foreclosures.  
Research in cities such as Chicago, Atlanta, and Baltimore indicate that increases 
in foreclosures corresponded to increases in subprime lending rates.46 Subprime 
mortgages were initially offered to homeowners as a means of promoting homeownership 
to those who could not participate in the prime mortgage market. Subprime mortgages are 
predatory loans because they take advantage of borrowers, for instance by penalizing 
homeowners for obtaining better loan terms if their credit improves.47 One option for 
increased resiliency might be to better regulate subprime lending. But as will be 
addressed in Chapter 6, because housing finance regulation occurs at the national level 
and local authorities have little impact on federal regulations, this be may a source of 
increased vulnerability.  
Socio-economic factors are also known to impact foreclosure rates. For instance, 
neighborhoods with high portions of African Americans and neighborhoods experiencing 
racial shifts are likely to have higher foreclosure rates, because these groups are more 
likely to finance home purchases with subprime mortgages.48 Other factors such as 
income and education also impact foreclosure rates.   
THE EFFECTS OF FORECLOSURES 
The impact of foreclosures is affected by a city’s resiliency. Resilient cities may 
be able to avoid the worst impacts of foreclosures, and may also recover at a faster rate. 
An analysis of foreclosures in Chicago shows that foreclosures of single-family houses 
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result in a 0.9 percent drop in housing values of nearby single-family houses.49 (Less 
conservative estimates put this figure slightly higher at 1.136 percent.)50 The study 
concludes that foreclosures in 1996 and 1997 in Chicago had a “cumulative impact” of 
anywhere between 598 million and 1.39 billion dollars.51 
Foreclosures also have impacts for local governments. Foreclosed properties 
require maintenance to prevent decreasing property values in the surrounding area, and in 
some instances, local authorities have assumed maintenance responsibilities. But this can 
be an additional financial burden for cities, and cities have taken creative steps to address 
this issue. For example, the city of Chula Vista, CA has adopted an abandonment clause. 
Upon initiating the foreclosure process, the lender must register all vacant properties with 
the city, and the lender is also responsible for the property’s maintenance.52 This 
approach places the financial burden of maintenance on lenders and not cities.  
 Also, because foreclosed properties contribute to declining property values, a 
city’s tax base would decrease. But foreclosed properties still rely on public services, 
such as fire and police departments. Detroit, MI has high foreclosed and abandoned 
property rates. The city is also experiencing severe financial problem. In extremely 
distressed neighborhoods, Detroit has reduced public services such as trash collection, 
and struggles with the question of how to balance the costs of service delivery while 
simultaneously ensuring “a baseline quality of life” for its citizens.53  
In addition to the financial costs of foreclosures, there are also social costs. 
Foreclosures can result in abandoned and vacant buildings, and also possibly harbor 
gangs and criminals. Baltimore, MD is known for its problems with abandoned 
properties. Numerous neighborhoods are filled with boarded-up houses, and surrounding 
neighborhoods face increased crime and poverty rates. Businesses in these areas also tend 
to fail or move to a different location, causing economic distress in the neighborhood.  
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Foreclosures may be a stressor that exerts a downward economic pressure for 
cities by reducing the value of assets and by preventing opportunities for asset value 
realization. This can result in decreased resiliency and increased vulnerability for cities. 
However, local authorities have limited options to avoid or reduce foreclosures because 
many of the regulatory and policy options available are not accessible to subnational 
governments. When confronted with a substantial stressor such as a foreclosure, what can 
local authorities do? One possible approach is to consider alternative mechanisms for 
economic revitalization, and these options will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
CHAPTER OVERVIEWS   
The next chapter examines the literature surrounding the economic recession and 
places the foreclosure crisis within the context of the Great Recession. In addition to 
exploring the economic growth and decline of cities, this chapter considers how cities 
have fared during the recession. Cities faced decreased tax bases, and this increased 
source of vulnerability results in cuts to public spending and services. Chapter 3 discusses 
the data sources and the methodological approaches used for the analysis. Instead of 
focusing on a single city, this report takes a broader approach by examining cities across 
the country.  
The research findings are presented in the next two chapters. Chapter 4 explores 
one of the main research questions: what factors explain the widely varying foreclosure 
rates across the country? To answer this question, a regression analysis referred to as the 
foreclosure prediction model is constructed. This analysis suggests that in addition to a 
variety of socio-economic characteristics, the foreclosure process is a significant factor. 
Chapter 5 addresses the second research question: what are the economic implications of 
foreclosures on urban economies? Again using a regression analysis, the findings indicate 
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that increasing foreclosure rates negatively impact economic growth. In addition, cities 
with growing economies should experience lower foreclosure rates.  
Chapter 6 explores the public policy ramifications of the empirical analysis. It 
demonstrates that foreclosures are a stressor on a city’s economy, and the application of 
this stressor causes increased economic vulnerability. A city may remain vulnerable to 
foreclosures because prevention measures are oftentimes beyond the capacity of local 
authorities. Given this predicament, Chapter 6 also explores alternative mechanisms to 
creating resilient urban economies to ensure economic stability.   
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Chapter 2: Cities and Economies   
Cities are drivers of economic growth, and it is important understand how they 
react during a period of economic decline. The growth or decline of cities can have 
implications not only for the city, but also for the surrounding region and the national 
economy. This chapter will first explore the factors impacting economic growth and 
decline. It will then discuss the onset of the Great Recession, and look at the various ways 
in which cities have been impacted.  
THE CAUSES OF URBAN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DECLINE   
The economic base model emphasizes trade with other economic regions and 
points to exports as a city’s main source of economic growth. A city will export goods 
that it specializes in, and as demand for these products increase, the level of exports (and 
income) from outside the city increases, thus stimulating economic growth.1 Despite the 
limitations of this theory, on the basis of this model, cities might attempt to specialize 
their economy in goods that are in high demand as one way of avoiding the economic 
impacts of a stressor. For instance, Detroit and Pittsburgh specialized in the auto and steel 
industry, respectively. For a time, these cities prospered because of high external demand 
for these goods. But as will be discussed in Chapter 6, this strategy might be a source of 
increased vulnerability. Another instance of a specialization becoming a vulnerability can 
be seen in cities like Phoenix, AZ and Las Vegas, NV. These cities had economies that 
centered around the housing industry, and as will be explored later, this specialization 
and also large population increases were a source of rapid economic growth. But the 
housing market’s decline and subsequent rise in foreclosures had a very negative impact 
for these cities.   
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In addition to the economic factors that contribute to urban growth, there are a 
variety of other elements to consider. One comprehensive study by Edward Glaeser and 
Jesse Shapiro examines growth in the 275 largest MSAs in the U.S. over two time 
periods, 1980 to 1990 and 1990 to 2000. Using the log of population as their dependent 
variable, the authors create four groups of independent variables. The first group includes 
the basic control variables, such as regional binary variables and the median population 
age. The second group, the density related variables, includes measurements such as the 
overall population, population density, and the percent of the population taking public 
transportation to work. The third group pertains to the weather. The final group 
encompasses human capital variables, and captures measurements such as education, 
income, and poverty. The vast majority of these variables are statistically significant.2 
Among other findings, the authors conclude that cities with greater human capital 
experience high growth rates.3  
Other studies confirm that cities with more educated populations grow faster than 
comparable cities with lesser educated populations. In particular, the researchers focus on 
the share of the population with a bachelor’s degree. They find that education, and the 
skills that educated workers have predicts productivity growth of a city.4 Cities with 
highly skilled populations are not growing because they are attractive places to live, but 
because they are becoming increasingly economically productive.5  
However, other studies find that the percent of the population graduating from 
high school or the percent of the population with some college education has a large 
effect on economic growth. The percent of the population graduating from college is of 
lesser importance, indicating that the overall education level of a population is important, 
not simply education at the higher levels.6   
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Another strand of research explores employment growth rates, which is one 
measure of economic growth, in a variety of industries. Researchers find that while 
regional demand for goods and comparative advantages can explain some of the 
employment trends, some of the explanation can also be attributed to the Marshall-
Arrow-Romer externality.7 It is advantageous for firms in the same industry to 
concentrate in the same city because knowledge sharing becomes easier, which stimulates 
innovation, industry growth, and efficiency.8  
One point that the literature fails to satisfactorily explain is how and why a 
specific city gets on the path to specializing in a certain industry. For example, why is the 
entertainment industry located in Los Angeles? Urban economists typically resort to 
either very specific explanations (for instance arguing that the entertainment industry in 
Los Angeles is concentrated there due to good weather), or very generalized ones (such 
as a favorable business climate).9  
Under normal economic conditions, the factors discussed above should cause 
urban economies to grow, or at least sustain constant levels of economic growth. But this 
report focuses on a city’s economy during a recession. The following sections briefly 
explore the origins of the recession, and then focus on how cities were impacted.  
CAUSES OF THE RECESSION  
The housing bubble is one of many important factors that contributed to the 
economic downturn. The housing bubble was created partly by low short-term interest 
rates, which allowed homeowners to make lower monthly mortgage payments even as 
housing prices continued to rise.10 Low interest rates also encouraged the proliferation of 
adjustable rate mortgages. As the housing bubble grew, a homeowner’s income could not 
keep pace with the rapidly increasing housing values. Therefore, many mortgage 
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companies began issuing adjustable rate mortgages, which allowed for lower monthly 
payments initially, but are also associated with higher foreclosure rates.11  
Low short-term interest rates also encouraged leveraging by allowing borrowed 
money to be invested in the market. Since there was more financial capital in the system, 
housing prices increased. When the housing bubble burst, the impact was more severe 
and had greater repercussions due to the excess financial capital.12  
As mentioned earlier, the relaxation of lending standards meant that those who 
would otherwise not have qualified for mortgages under normal lending criteria obtained 
mortgages. Government regulations played an important role in the relaxation of lending 
standards. For example, the 1995 Community Reinvestment Act enacted new lending 
requirements for banks. One way for banks to meet these new standards was to increase 
lending to low-income or minorities.  
But because these borrowers lacked the necessary credit scores and other 
perquisites for prime mortgages (defined as mortgages with favorable financial terms), 
many were instead issued subprime mortgages. Subprime mortgages have interest rates 
that are between three and five percentage points higher than prime mortgages. In 
addition, while the length of both prime and subprime mortgages is 30 years, the interest 
rate of a subprime mortgage interest rates are typically fixed for only two years, leaving 
homeowners exposed to fluctuating interest rates for the remaining 28 years.13 Subprime 
mortgages may offer low initial interest rates, but during the remaining years interest 
rates can rise quite substantially, which homeowners may be unable to manage.14 
Subprime mortgage markets also typically face less federal regulation than prime 
mortgage markets.15 This allows for the possibility of deceptive and fraudulent lending 
practices.  
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Once the housing bubble burst, housing prices began to fall sharply. 
Homeowners, especially those with less favorable mortgage terms, were unable to make 
mortgage payments when their interest rates rose.16 At the same time, they could not 
refinance their house because the decreasing value of their home meant that they had 
negative equity.17 That is, the house was now worth less than what the homeowner owed. 
As a result, foreclosures occurred at increasing rates.  
In March 2008, the financial sector began to collapse, in part because this sector 
had heavily invested in mortgages that were now underwater. Investment banks such as 
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers failed. Government funds were used to bail out 
Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, on the grounds that they were essential to ensuring that 
mortgage markets continued to function.  
Further complicating this situation and exacerbating the economic recession was a 
tightening credit market. Banks and financial lenders were reluctant to lend capital to 
businesses. Both small and large businesses were impacted by tightening credit markets, 
but credit lines improved at a slower rate for small businesses.18 This is problematic 
because, according to the Federal Reserve, small businesses (defined as those with less 
than 500 employees) “accounted for nearly 80 percent of total covered sector 
employment and over 70 percent of first-quarter payroll.”19 Thus, these types of 
businesses can be considered drivers of economic growth, and their sluggish recovery has 
hindered economic recovery and growth for cities.   
 As a result of these and other circumstances, the country entered a steep 
economic decline, and no single explanatory factor is completely responsible for the 
economic downturn. The foreclosure crisis may be considered a stressor that interacted 
with other explanatory factors and contributed to the recession. In an attempt to 
understand the causes of the economic crisis, the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
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Investigations in 2011 released a report that concluded “the crisis was not a natural 
disaster, but the result of high risk, complex financial products; undisclosed conflicts of 
interest; and the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market itself to 
rein in the excesses of Wall Street.”20 Within this context of steep economic decline, the 
median American family lost about 40 percent of its wealth.21 The loss of wealth is just 
one of the many impacts of the recession.  
IMPACTS OF THE RECESSION 
A common method of measuring economic health is the unemployment rate. In 
December 2012, the unemployment rate was 7.8 percent.22 This rate is higher than the 
highest unemployment rate after the 2001 recession.23 However, unemployment rates do 
not capture people have left the labor force. Economists have calculated that the number 
of people absent from the labor force is about four million.24 If these people were in the 
labor force (and they would presumably be unemployed), the unemployment rate would 
be closer to 10 percent.25 
Another method of measuring the impact of the recession is to examine what 
economists call the “jobs gap.” This is a measurement of the number of jobs necessary to 
restore the U.S. labor market to pre-recession levels.26 The current jobs gap is 9.1 million 
jobs.27 According to the Economic Policy Institute, this value is the combination of two 
numbers: the 3.4 million jobs lost during the recession, and the 5.8 million jobs that 
should have been, but were not, created to absorb the entry of new labor into the labor 
market.28  
Compared to prior recessions, the Great Recession resulted in a much higher job 
deficit and unemployment rate. Recovery has been elusive due to the scope, severity and 
length of the Great Recession.29 As the Economic Policy Institute succinctly concluded, 
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“the Great Recession has brought the worst of both worlds: extraordinarily severe job 
loss, combined with an extremely sluggish recovery.”30  
Of particular relevance is the recession’s impact on state and city governments. 
Subnational governments are important actors because they are responsible for direct 
service provision to citizens and also determine spending on public goods.31 As described 
earlier, state and local governments are economic drivers. According to the Brookings 
Institution, state and local governments together account for 12 percent of GDP, and 
employ one out of seven workers, which is more than any other industry, including the 
health care, retail or manufacturing sectors.32 Subnational governments also generate 
demand for goods provided by the private sector, which causes economic growth.  
Subnational governments are also economic drivers because of the public services 
they provide, such as Medicaid and unemployment benefits. Not surprisingly, as the 
recession continued, state and local governments faced increased demand from citizens 
for public services, but also faced decreasing revenue. 17 percent of the federal 
government’s budget is allocated to state and local governments.33 While states get 
additional revenue from income and sales tax, local governments rely primarily on 
property taxes.34 As consumer spending dropped, but demand for services increased, 
subnational governments faced increasing budget deficits. The federal government 
responded to this shortfall through fiscal transfers and the 2009 American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act. These unprecedented actions proved insufficient given the vast 
deficits that state and local governments faced. Some estimates suggest that between 
2009 and 2012, states faced over $540 billion in budget deficits.35  
For the majority of states, a balanced budget is constitutionally mandated. Instead 
of tax increases, many states resorted to spending cuts in sectors such as education, health 
care and human services.36 In addition to providing fewer services for citizens, 
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employment in the public sector dropped. Because of these spending cuts, the public 
sector is hiring employees at lower rates, representing a drag on economic recovery that 
was not present in previous recessions.37 From August 2008 to September 2012, state 
payrolls declined by 2.6 percent, and local payrolls declined by 3.3 percent; this 
represents 137,000 jobs and 437,000 jobs respectively.38 This is problematic given earlier 
assertions of subnational governments as economic drivers.  
 Cities are engines of economic growth in the national economy, and have been 
severely impacted by the recession. There are numerous theories that describe how a city 
will economically grow. Some theories point to exports as source of economic growth, 
while others stress labor force education. These and other elements discussed in this 
chapter will serve as a foundation for Chapter 6, which explores steps cities can take to 
develop resilient and competitive economies.  
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Chapter 3: Data and Methods  
The empirical questions to be addressed in this report concern (1) the factors that 
explain foreclosure rates in cities and (2) the effect of foreclosure rates on urban 
economies. What factors explain why the Austin-Round Rock, TX, MSA has an 
extremely low foreclosure rate of 1.79 percent, while the Miami-Fort Lauderdale-
Pompano Beach, FL, MSA has a foreclosure rate of 18.63 percent? There are a variety of 
factors, such as socio-economic characteristics, neighborhood qualities, and qualities of 
the housing stock that are expected to influence foreclosure rates. In addition, how do 
urban economies respond to foreclosures? Factors that impact economic conditions in 
cities include, but are not limited to, the labor force’s educational attainment and the 
types of industries located in the city. The method adopted to answer these questions is 
multiple regression analyses using metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) as the unit of 
analysis.  
EXPLAINING FORECLOSURE RATES  
Cities across the country have been impacted by foreclosures, although the impact 
varies dramatically. Because cities are the heart of modern economies, their response to 
economic stressors such as foreclosures is important to consider, especially during an 
economic downturn such as the Great Recession.  
In the sample used in this report, the Austin-Round Rock, TX, MSA has the 
lowest foreclosure rate at 1.79 percent. The Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL, 
MSA has a foreclosure rate of 18.63 percent, which is the highest foreclosure rate in the 
sample. Figure 1 details this variation.  
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Figure 1: 2011 Foreclosure Rate Distribution Among 100 Metropolitan Areas  
While there are many studies in the literature that explore the causes of 
foreclosures, these studies tend to focus on variation in foreclosure rates within a single 
city and use census tracts as the unit of analysis. This analytical approach has been used 
in cities such as Chicago, IL and Atlanta, GA. The drawback to this approach is that 
results are typically only generalizable to the city being analyzed. This report instead 
takes a larger focus and looks at the 100 largest MSAs in the country on the basis of 
population, thus allowing for the identification of national-level trends that explain 
foreclosures. The literature has also identified a variety of socio-economic, 
neighborhood, and housing characteristics that explain the widely varying foreclosure 
rates. Using these variables as a starting point, the foreclosure prediction model explores 
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According to the Office of Management and Budget, an MSA is defined as one or 
more counties with “at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more population, plus 
adjacent territory that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the core 
as measured by commuting ties.”1 In this sample, the Chicago Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, 
IL-IN-WI is the largest MSA, and the Modesto, CA, MSA is the smallest. The 
populations of these two MSAs are 9,516,047 people and 166,136 people, respectively, 
indicating the heterogeneity of cities included in the sample. Geographically, almost a 
third of the sample (29 MSAs) are located in the Southeast region, based on the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis classifications. This region includes, but is not limited to states 
such as Florida, Virginia, and Louisiana (see Appendix A for more details).  
The rationale for using the 100 largest MSAs as the sample is twofold. The 100 
largest MSAs contain about 54 percent of the total U.S. population.i Because the majority 
of the country’s population lives in these MSAs, this sample is an inclusive and 
representative one. In addition, data availability were an ongoing source of concern. At 
the MSA level, data were most readily available for the 100 largest MSAs, making this 
sample a logical and convenient choice. One problem with using MSAs as a 
measurement unit is that the city center is not separated from the surrounding suburbs. 
The literature is inconclusive on whether center cities of suburban jurisdictions 
experience higher foreclosure rates, but it would not be surprising to find some 
differences between the two areas.  
                                                 
i The total population in the 100 largest MSAs is 169,093,763. 2011 Census Bureau estimates of the US 
population is 311,587,816. See http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html for more information.  
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THE METHODOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE FORECLOSURE PREDICTION MODEL  
The equation developed for the foreclosure prediction model explains the 
foreclosure rate variation using regional binary variables, a binary variable indicating the 
foreclosure process, and three sets of variables capturing the financial/socio-economic 
(F/SE) of homeowners, housing (H) characteristics, and neighborhood qualities (N). The 
variables for this analysis are described below, and are also shown in Table 1. The 
equation for the foreclosure prediction model is:  
 
1) Log FCRate = f [(Regional Binary Variables), (TypeFC), (F/SE), (H), (N)] 
 
The dependent variable was obtained from Foreclosure-Response.org, an online 
resource developed by Center for Housing Policy, the Local Initiatives Support 
Commission, and the Urban Institute.2 The foreclosure rate of an MSA comes from 
examination of LPS Applied Analytics data by the Local Initiatives Support Council, and 
was tabulated by the Urban Institute.3 The rate of foreclosures is defined as the number of 
mortgages that are “in foreclosure relative to active first-lien mortgages.”4 The data for 
this variable were available at four different points during 2011: March, June, September, 
and December. However, the data for all other variables were only available at one point 
per year. Thus, an average of the values from March, June, September, and December 
was taken to create a variable that represented the 2011 foreclosure rate, in an attempt to 
cover the same time span as all other variables.  
Initially, the dependent variable for the foreclosure prediction model was the 
foreclosure rates (entered as a percentage) of an MSA. However, upon examining the 
residual plot for this variable, a transformation was required because the residuals had a 
distinct “U” shape (see Appendix B). This suggests a non-linear relationship between the 
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dependent and independent variables, and a transformation is required to prevent model 
misspecification. Both a logarithmic and a square root transformation were attempted. In 
addition to being easier to interpret, the log transformation reduced more of the 
heteroskedasticity present in the model. Transforming the foreclosure rate into a log 
results in a log-lin model. The left-hand side of the equation is in log form, but the right-
hand side is not, and the coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticitys of demand. 
The Bureau of Economics divides the country into eight regions, and the regional 
binary variables were constructed on the basis of these regions. To avoid perfect 
correlation, region four was excluded because it had the lowest average foreclosure rate. 
See Appendix A for a table describing the regions and the average foreclosure rate in 
each region.  
To construct the variable indicating the type of foreclosure, a Freddie Mac 
Working Paper, Interventions in Mortgage Default: Policies and Practices to Prevent 
Home Loss and Lower Costs, by Amy Crew Cutts and William A. Merrill was consulted. 
This variable is a binary variable. 1 indicates the state follows a judicial foreclosure 
process, and 0 indicates a statutory foreclosure process. 22 states use a judicial 
foreclosure process. Other states permit both procedures, but in these states, statutory 
foreclosures are much more common.5 Because this variable is determined on the basis of 
state law, determining the value proved difficult when MSAs fell in two or more states 
with differing foreclosures processes. ii The value was ultimately determined on the basis 
of where the majority of the MSA’s population lived.  
                                                 
ii To overcome this issue, documentation by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the federal 
agency that classifies MSAs and other geographical delineations was consulted. In OMB Bulletin No. 10-
02, the agency lists the counties that compose each MSA. If an MSA crossed state lines, and the states had 
differing foreclosure processes, the state with the most counties was determined. The assumption behind 
this logic was that determining which state had the most counties would indicate where the majority of the 
population in the MSA lived, and thus the type of foreclosure process that the majority of the MSA’s 
population faced. The Kansas City MO-KS MSA is an illustrative example. Missouri has a statutory 
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The data for the financial and socio-economic variables (F/SE) were taken from 
the Census Bureau using the American Factfinder. The data were from 2011. American 
Community Survey three year estimates were used because they are a balance between 
reliability and currency.6 The data in this category include measures of income, 
education, poverty, and racial classifications. In some instances, 2011 data from the 
Census Bureau was not available for some MSAs. Instead of imputing missing values, 
2009 data were used instead.iii 
Similar to the F/SE category, the data for the housing qualities (H) variables were 
taken from the 2011 American Community Survey. These variables include 
measurements for housing size, property values, and the age of the housing stock.  
The neighborhood (N) qualities variables were also taken from the 2011 
American Community Survey. The variables in this category are the real estate tax value, 
along with control variables for the population and population change. Controlling for the 
population ensures that the effect of a city’s size is held constant. Including a variable 
capturing population change is important because it accounts for the fact that not all cities 
are growing at the same rate. Those with higher population growth rates might experience 
higher foreclosure rates simply because there are more homeowners with newer 
mortgages in the city. Adding a variable to measure the population change accounts for 
this feature.   
                                                                                                                                                 
foreclosure process, and Kansas has a judicial foreclosure process. However, this MSA is composed of six 
counties in Kansas, and nine counties in Missouri. Therefore, since more counties are located in Missouri, 
this MSA was deemed to have a statutory foreclosure process. An identical process was followed when 
determining the region for an MSA that fell in different states that were located in different regions. 
iii 2009 data was used for the following MSAs: Austin-Round Rock, TX; Bakersfield, CA; Bradenton-
Sarasota Venice, FL; Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC; Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI; 
Louisville Jefferson County, KY-IN; Orlando-Kissimmee, FL; Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale AZ; Portland-
Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA; and San Antonio TX. 
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The table below includes a description of the variables included in the analysis. In 
the table, “level of analysis” refers to the geographical level at which the variable is 
measured. “Category of analysis” refers to three main categories mentioned earlier: 
neighborhood qualities (N), housing qualities (H), and financial/socio-economic (F/SE) 
qualities.  
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Table 1, Continued  
DVHisp Percent of MSA’s 
population that is 
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EXPLAINING THE ECONOMIC VITALITY OF CITIES  
The dynamics at work in urban economies are complex. How does the 
introduction and application of a stressor like a foreclosure impact urban economies? The 
economic health model aims to answer this question. Some theories in the literature 
emphasize specialization, and suggest a city will export a good it specializes in, causing 
economic growth. Sectors with high multipliers also contribute to economic growth, 
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because these industries create jobs in other sectors. Other studies suggest that the labor 
force, and specifically its educational attainment, is a critical factor of economic growth.  
There are numerous options to measure economic growth and decline. 
Unemployment rates are often used, but as discussed earlier, unemployment rates are 
misleading because they do not capture people who are no longer looking for 
employment. Another common approach is to use a city’s population as a growth 
measure, but population changes do not capture the economic dimension this research 
question seeks to explain. The economic health model therefore uses employment rates as 
a measure of economic growth or decline. Using employment rates directly captures 
economic vitality by measuring the portion of the population participating in the labor 
force.  
THE METHODOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE ECONOMIC HEALTH MODEL  
The economic health model looks at factors that impact urban growth and decline. 
For the purposes of simplifying the analysis, the independent variables were grouped 
according to the categories used by Edward Glaeser: human capital variables (H), density 
related variables (D), and control variables (C), Based on the literature, another category, 
called economic indicators (E), was created. Similar to the foreclosure prediction model, 
the unit of analysis for this model is an MSA. Table 2 contains a description of these 
variables. The equation for the economic health model is:  
 
2) Employment Rate = f [(FCRate), (E), (H), (D), (C)] 
 
Employment rates are used an instrumental variable to measure a city’s economic 
growth or decline. An instrumental variable, or proxy variable, is a variable that is not of 
 33
direct interest, but is used to capture the effects of a phenomenon of interest. In this 
analysis, the variable of direct interest is not employment rates. Instead, on the basis of 
research reviewed in previous chapters, employment rates are used to capture economic 
growth or decline. One advantage of using an instrumental variable is that they are 
typically correlated with the independent variables, but not with the residual terms. The 
main shortcoming of this approach is that it can be difficult to find instrumental variables 
that adequately capture the characteristic of interest. Employment rates were obtained 
through the Census Bureau’s American Factfinder, and similar to the previous model, 
three year estimates were used. Like the previous model, the values for the foreclosure 
rate variables originate from examination of LPS Applied Analytics data by the Local 
Initiatives Support Council, and were tabulated by the Urban Institute.9  
The first category of independent variables, the economic indicators (E), include 
variables that measure state GDP levels, job creation in an MSA, export values, and the 
percentage of manufacturing jobs. State GDP levels were obtained from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. The source of all other variables in this category was the Brookings 
Institution’s Metropolitan Policy Program. However, the most recent data available from 
Brookings were from 2010. Data for all other variables were from 2011, but despite this 
inconsistency, there is little reason to expect that the results of the analysis will be 
significantly inaccurate. In addition, the data from Brookings contained a few missing 
values and these were imputed for certain MSAs.iv  
                                                 
iv For the Bradenton-Sarasota-Venice, FL; Lancaster, PA; Lansing, MI; and Santa Rose-Petaluma, CA 
MSAs, the following variables were imputed: the export value of an MSA (the ExportValue variable) and 
the number of job supported by export sectors (the ExportProdJobs variable).  
In addition, for the Brandenton-Sarasota-Venice FL; Lansing MI; Portland ME; and Santa Rosa-Petaluma, 
CA MSAs, the following variables were imputed: manufacturing jobs as a percent of all jobs (the 
Manufactjobs variable), the percent change in manufacturing jobs from 2000 to 2010 (the  
Changemanufactjobs variables) and the percent of manufacturing jobs considered very high tech (the 
Manufvhightech variable). The alternative to imputation is to drop the observation entirely from the 
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The second group of independent variables, the human capital (H) variables, 
capture labor force qualities that are likely to impact economic growth, such as poverty 
and education levels. The Census Bureau was the source of all variables in this category.  
The density related (D) category includes three variables: the 2011 population, the 
change in population between 2005 and 2010, and the average commuting time to 
employment. Like the previous category, the data for this category were taken from the 
Census Bureau.  
The final category of variables, the control variables (C) are included to account 
for the effects of income and race. Including these variables ensures that their effects are 
held constant across a sample of heterogeneous MSAs. 
The table below describes the variables, their measurement units, and the source. 
“Level of analysis” refers to the geographic level at which the variable was measured, 











                                                                                                                                                 
analysis. Imputing is advantageous because it maintains the sample size. Because the imputed value is the 
mean of all available non-imputed data, the observation does not impact the portion of explained variation. 
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Employmentrate Percent of 
population in 
the labor force 
that is employed 
US Census 
Bureau 
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StateGDP Total GDP of a 
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Percent MSA E 
Manufvhightech Portion of 
manufacturing 





Percent MSA E 




Billions of dollars MSA E 
Exportprodjobs “Jobs supported 




or service.”12  
Brookings 
Institution 








Percent MSA E 
Belowpovline Percent of 
families whose 
income is below 
the poverty line 




Percent MSA H 




Table 2, Continued  
Bachelorsdegree Percent of 
population age 
25 or older with 
a bachelor’s 
degree or higher 
US Census 
Bureau 
Percent MSA H 
Somecollege Percent of 
population with 
some college, 
but no degree 
US Census 
Bureau 
Percent MSA H 








Percent MSA H 
Pop 2011 population US Census 
Bureau 
Numerical value MSA D 
Popchange Population 
change from 




Percent MSA D 
Meantraveltime Mean travel 
time to work 
US Census 
Bureau 
Minutes MSA D 
Medincome Median 
household 
income in 2011 
US Census 
Bureau 
Numerical Value MSA C 




Coded 1 if the 
percentage was 
greater than or 





Percent MSA C 






Percent MSA C 
 
This regression model most likely suffers from simultaneity since there may be 
mutual causation between employment rates and foreclosure rates. As the foreclosure rate 
in a city increases, a city may experience economic decline. Foreclosed properties could 
 37
exert a downward economic influence on an MSA because these properties contribute 
little to a city’s tax base, but consume resources such as public services.  
The relationship between foreclosures and employment rates may also work in the 
opposite direction. As economic conditions in an MSA decline and employment rates 
decrease, the foreclosure rate may increase because families lack the necessary income to 
make mortgage payments. Ignoring the mutual causation or simultaneity and using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to estimate the regression model may cause the 
coefficients to be unreliable. Regardless of the sample size, the coefficients will not be 
truly representative of the population coefficients.  
In the presence of simultaneity, describing variables as independent and 
dependent becomes problematic since some variables are mutually determined. In these 
circumstances, a system of equations is developed to capture these complex relationships 
and variables are labeled endogenous and exogenous. Endogenous variables are those 
determined within the system of equations, and exogenous variables are determined 
outside the system. The number of equations in a model is determined by the number of 
endogenous variables. Employment rates and foreclosure rates are the endogenous 
variable, and a two equation model is developed. In order for a system of equations to be 
valid, they must meet identification criteria. The system of equations developed were:  
 
3) Employmentrate = f(logforeclosurerate, stategdp, manufvhightech, 
changemanufjobs, belowpovline, bachelorsdegree, meantraveltime, hispanic) 
4) Logforeclosure = f(typeforeclosure, medincome, medincomewithmortgage, 
bachelorsdegree, medtaxrate, sq1949, sq1950, sq1970, sq1990) 
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One method to detect simultaneity is the Hausman specification test. This test 
captures the residuals of an OLS regression with one of the suspected endogenous 
variables as the regressand. These residuals are then used as a regressor in a regression 
where the other endogenous variable is the regressand. If these residuals are statistically 
significant, then simultaneity is present in the model. In the presence of simultaneity, 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) is used to estimate the model. Based on the results of the 
Hausman specification test, the economic health model suffers from simultaneity, and 
2SLS is used to estimate the model. These results will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 5.  
This chapter described the methodology used to construct the two regression 
models used in this report. Although there were some shortcomings involving the data 
and the construction of the models, none represent serious limitations. The following two 
chapters present the results of the empirical analyses.  
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Chapter 4: The Causes of Foreclosures 
This chapter addresses the following research question: what factors contribute to 
the widely varying foreclosure rates seen across the 100 largest MSAs? The foreclosure 
prediction model aims to answer this question, and provides clarification on the causes of 
foreclosures. This model will also set the foundation for determining the impact of 
foreclosures on urban economies.  
THE VARIABLES USED IN THE FORECLOSURE PREDICTION MODEL  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the literature suggests that there are three 
main categories of variables to include when examining foreclosures: variables 
describing neighborhood qualities, variables describing the housing stock, and variables 
describing the homeowners themselves. The table below presents the descriptive statistics 






















Fcrate 5.6898 2.961046 1.79 18.63 N/A 
DVReg1 .08 .2726599 0 1 N/A 
DVReg2 .13 .3379977 0 1 N/A 
DVReg3 .13 .3379977 0 1 N/A 
DVReg4 .06 .2386833   0 1 N/A 
DVReg5 .29 .456048 0 1 N/A 
DVReg6 .11 .314466 0 1 N/A 
DVReg7 .04 .1969464 0 1 N/A 
DVReg8 .16 .3684529 0 1 N/A 
Typefc .46 .5009083 0 1 N/A 
Unemployed 6.39 1.473846 0 10.8 F/SE 
BelowPovLine 10.632 3.474638 5.4 31.5 F/SE 
Medincome 53,926.42 9,520.05 32,533 87,653 F/SE 
Medincomewithmort 78,802.77 13747.22 52,193 127,101 F/SE 
Africanamer 12.923 10.07362 .5 47.9 F/SE 
Hisp 15.803 16.5807 1.3 90.6 F/SE 
Bachelorsdegree 29.567 6.279035 14.3 47.3 F/SE 
Rooms 5.587 .338044 4.7 6.2 H 
Housevaluewithmort 218,967 105,144.6 96,600 632,700 H 
Medhousecost 4,141.74 14780.89 1074 104,290 H 
Sq1949 460.6152 523.5827 1 2371.69 H 
Sq1950 524.1906 256.5112 57.76 1246.09 H 
Sq1970 963.4146 391.5987 282.24 1949.223 H 
Sq1990 988.006 722.0458 125.44   3,994.24 H 
Medtaxrate 2,576.8 1,273.837 789 6,986 N 
Pop2011 1,690,938 1,706,868 166,136     9,516,047 N 
Popchange 138,252.5 242,116.9 -148,549 2,149,907 N 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Foreclosure Prediction Model  
A few statistics in the table are worth noting. First, the unemployment rate is 0 
percent in the Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk CT MSA, accounting for the 0 minimum 
value in Table 3. This is highly unlikely, and almost certainly due to the way the variable 
was measured or calculated by the Census Bureau. Also, the Sq1949 variable has a 
minimum value of 1. This variable is calculated as the percent of houses built before 
1949 squared. A review of the raw data shows that the MSA with this value is Las Vegas-
Paradise, NV. While this is a fairly low percentage, it is most likely not a measurement 
error. Because the growth and development of the southwestern region of the U.S. 
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occurred fairly recently, it is not surprising that the housing stock is relatively new. Small 
portions of the housing stock would have been built before 1949. Finally, the descriptive 
statistics for regions two and three are identical. This occurred because the number of 
observations in both regions are equal. Since all observations will be entered as 1 for 
these binary variables, the descriptive statistics are identical.  
 EXPECTED RESULTS   
Based on the literature, it is expected that foreclosure rates vary across regions in 
the country. That is, foreclosures are not equally distributed across the country. MSAs in 
the southeastern U.S., such as Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL and 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL, have very high foreclosure rates. On average, the MSAs in 
the southeast have an average foreclosure rate of 7.18 percent. In contrast, the MSAs in 
this sample that are located in the Plains region, (this region includes North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, and Missouri) have on average the lowest 
foreclosure rate in the sample, 3.37 percent. Given these regional differences, it is 
expected that these binary variables will be statistically significant.  
The foreclosure type variable is another binary variable in the model that captures 
the type of foreclosure process. As discussed earlier, there are two different processes, 
judicial and statutory. It is expected that a judicial process should result in a lower 
foreclosure rate.  
The financial/socio-economic variables in this model are used to control for 
varying levels of socio-economic and financial attainment across different MSAs. A 
priori, it is expected that increases in both median income variables and the percent of the 
population with a bachelor’s degree or higher would all cause a decrease in foreclosure 
rates. Conversely, we would expect that as the percent of the population in an MSA 
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composed of Hispanics and African Americans would result in increasing foreclosure 
rates. These groups are more likely to receive adjustable rate mortgages, meaning that 
their likelihood of being foreclosed upon increases. It is also expected that the 
unemployment and poverty variables would cause foreclosure rates to increase.  
The variables included in the housing quality category take into account 
differences in the housing stock across MSAs. The most important variables in this 
category capture the age of the housing stock. Newer housing stock is expected to have 
higher foreclosure rates. The more recently built a house is, the more likely its purchase 
will be financed with risky financial instruments.  
The neighborhood quality variables include population, population change, and 
the median real estate tax rate. Including the population variables is important because 
they ensure that MSAs of different sizes will be treated equally in the regression. The 
median real estate tax is important because high tax rates also place a downward pressure 
on housing values, and decreasing property values can result in higher foreclosure rates.  
PRESENTATION OF THE FORECLOSURE PREDICTION MODEL  
The table below presents the saturated version of the foreclosure prediction 
model, and indicates the beta coefficients and t statistics. The dependent variable is the 
log of the foreclosure rate, and all coefficients are included in the model. The full output 




























Medincome 0.215 x 10-4
 (2.85)**
medincomewithmort -0.205 x 10-4
 (-3.78)**
Africanamer 0.003 







housevaluewithmort 2.7 x 10-7
 (0.76)
Medhousecost -4.86 x 10-7
 (-0.73)
sq1949 0.174 x 10-3
 (2.35)*
Table 4: Estimating the Log of the Foreclosure Rate (Saturated Version)  
 45
Table 4, Continued 
sq1950 0.202 x 10-3
 (2.03)*
sq1970 0.196 x 10-3
 (3.02)**
sq1990 0.104 x 10-3
 (2.29)*
Medtaxrate 0.494 x 10-4
 (2.31)*
pop2011 1.04 x 10-8
 (1.39)






* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS  
The R2 value in this model suggests that about 74 percent of the foreclosure rate 
variation can be explained by these independent variables. The model is statistically 
significant overall, as evidenced by the F statistic of 11.27. Out of the 25 independent 
variables in the analysis, 10 are statistically significant. This model does not appear to 
suffer from major OLS violations (see Appendix D).  
One of the most surprising results from this model is the insignificance of all the 
regional dummy variables. Both the research literature and media reports suggest that 
there is a strong regional force that influences foreclosure rates. In this analysis, region 
four was dropped because it had the lowest foreclosure rate (3.37 percent). Upon 
discovering the insignificance of these variables, a variety of steps were taken. Numerous 
restricted least square tests were conducted. In addition, alternate categorizations and an 
extension of the spatial submarket theory were attempted. (See Appendix E for the details 
of these procedures.) Determining regional categorizations are important for explaining 
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foreclosure rate variation, and are also necessary to avoid problems of model 
misspecification.  
There are several possible explanations for the insignificant regional 
categorizations. First, it is possible that the sample of MSAs selected for analysis is not 
adequately representative of the population. The logic behind this argument lies in the 
construction of the model—the sample was not a simple random sample. Instead, the 100 
largest MSAs on the basis of population were chosen. But since the majority of the 
country’s population lives in the 100 largest MSAs, this sample is an inclusive and 
representative one. Alternatively, there may be another way to categorize cities. For 
instance, dividing cities in categories on the basis of their economic function (political, 
trade, or industrial) may have produced statistically significant results.   
Finally, in this model it is possible that the variables capturing the age of the 
housing stock are picking up the regional dummy variables’ variation. That is, the 
variation explained by the regional dummy variables is being captured by other variables. 
This would suggest that the similarity of an MSA to other MSAs located nearby, and not 
state-level similarities, is the important defining quality to serve as a basis for 
categorization.  
The type of foreclosure process is highly significant in this model, but the sign is 
incorrect. The results suggest that having a judicial foreclosure process causes increasing 
foreclosure rates. This is counter-intuitive and this result is not supported in the literature. 
A possible explanation for this is that lenders are more experienced and prepared to 
handle court proceedings than a typical homeowner, resulting in more positive outcomes 
for mortgage lenders.  
In the financial/socio-economic status category, the unemployed variable, both 
income variables, and the bachelor’s degree variable were statistically significant. 
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However, the variables measuring the overall median income in an MSA and the poverty 
level display unexpected signs. We would expect that as the overall median income in an 
MSA increases, foreclosures decrease. Conversely, we would expect that as the percent 
of the population living below the poverty line increases, foreclosures would also 
increase, not decrease as the regression output suggests. Another unexpected finding 
from this analysis is the insignificance of both of the Hispanic and African American 
variables.  
The majority of the literature examining foreclosures within a single city finds 
that racial breakdowns are significant variables. However, a study examining foreclosures 
across the 75 largest MSAs also finds that areas with larger minority populations do not 
have statistically significant rates of real estate owned properties (this term refers to a 
property that is owned by the bank because the entire foreclosure process is completed).1 
This indicates that while race may have an effect on foreclosures for an individual 
homeowner, the racial composition of a city does not impact foreclosures rates of an 
MSA.  
Within the housing quality category, only the variables capturing the age of the 
housing stock were significant. Following the convention seen in the literature, these 
variables were squared in order to reflect the non-linear effect of age. In general, these 
variables suggest that the older housing stock will have more foreclosures.  
The only statistically significant variable in the neighborhood quality category 
was the median real estate tax. The regression results shows that increasing the median 
real estate tax increases the foreclosure rate, but by a very small amount.  
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UNSATURATED VERSION OF THE FORECLOSURE PREDICTION MODEL  
The table below shows the beta coefficients and t statistics for the final version of 
the foreclosure prediction model. This model excludes all insignificant variables, with the 
exception of the African American and Hispanic variables. See Appendix F and G for 







medincome 0.158 x 10-4
 (2.85)**








sq1949 0.242 x 10-3
 (4.23)**
sq1950 0.339 x 10-3
 (3.56)**
sq1970 0.344 x 10-3
 (5.11)**
sq1990 0.167 x 10-3
 (3.64)**






* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 5: Estimating the Log of the Foreclosure Rate (Unsaturated Version)  
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Generally, the results of this table mirror the results of the saturated regression 
model. The R2 value, while lower than the saturated model, still indicates that over half of 
the variation in foreclosure rates is being explained. Like the saturated model, this 
regression model is also statistically significant on the basis of an F test.  
The results indicate that if there is a judicial foreclosure process, then the log of 
the foreclosure rate increases by 0.14. As discussed above, it is expected that judicial 
foreclosure processes should lower foreclosure rates.  
Within the financial/socio-economic category, the variable measuring bachelor’s 
degree attainment or higher levels of education becomes insignificant. Another 
noteworthy finding in this model is that Hispanic dummy variable is significant, but the 
sign is unexpected, indicating that high percentages of Hispanics in an MSA will cause 
foreclosure rates to decrease. Like in the saturated model, the income variables are both 
statistically significant, but their signs suggest different impacts on foreclosure rates. As 
mentioned above, it is expected that increasing income rates result in lowered foreclosure 
rates.  
In the housing quality category, the variables capturing the age of the house of the 
housing stock indicate that newer housing stock should have lower foreclosure rates. This 
is an unanticipated result because newer housing stock, is more likely to be financed with 
subprime loans, which will cause high foreclosure rates. This is the case in cities like 
Phoenix, AZ, and these types of financial instruments may be a source of increased 
vulnerability for cities.  
The only significant variable in the neighborhood qualities category is the 
property tax rate. The results indicate that increasing tax rates results in increasing 
foreclosure rates. A possible explanation is that high tax rates place an additional 
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financial burden on an already overextended family, thus resulting in missed mortgage 
payments. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL 
One limitation of the model is the possibility of excluded independent variables, 
but given the R2 value of 0.63, this is not a serious limitation. Ideally, one variable in the 
financial/socio-economic category would include a measure of subprime mortgages 
issued, because these mortgages are associated with a high probability of foreclosure. 
However, this variable was not accessible, and was omitted from the model. While there 
may be other missing variables in the model, this one is the most concerning.  
Another limitation concerns the study’s design. Ideally, an individual homeowner 
would be the unit of analysis, allowing the effects of homeowner characteristics to 
explain foreclosures.2 However, this data were not available. Aggregating data to an 
MSA level means that we run the risk of arriving at conclusions that are then applied to 
individuals, even if the conclusions do not exist at the individual level. This problem is 
called the ecological fallacy. Another advantage of individual level data is that it allows 
for the possibility of aggregating upwards, thus providing more flexibility for analytical 
purposes. But data at the aggregate level cannot be disaggregated to the individual level. 
However, these limitations are not serious enough to invalidate the results of the model.  
ALTERNATIVE PRESENTATION OF THE FORECLOSURE PREDICTION MODEL   
As the analysis above shows, many different factors need to be considered, 
simultaneously, when examining foreclosures and it difficult to assess exactly what 
factors are at work. An alternate approach to explaining the complex effects of 
foreclosures is to create hypothetical cities, allowing only certain variables of interest to 
vary, and observing how the foreclosure rate changes.  
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Table 6 allows only income levels to vary, and holds all other variables constant. 
The low or high income values were found by multiplying the beta coefficient by the 25th 
or 75th percentile, respectively. The variables being held constant were calculated by 
multiplying the beta coefficient and the mean, and sum of these values for all variables 
being held constant is indicated in the other constant column of the table below. The 
middle housing stock variable was created by combining the 1950 and 1970 housing 
stock variables. The regression constant in the table is the constant in the regression 
output.  
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Table 6: Cities With Varying Income Levels 
City A and City B differ only in respect to their median income levels. City A has 
a high median income level, and City B has a low median income level. As expected, 
cities with high income levels experience lower foreclosure rates, although the difference 
is not as large as expected.  
Table 7 allows the percentage of African Americans to vary. Since the Hispanic 
variable is a binary variable, it was not allowed to vary, and like other variables, its value 
was calculated as the beta coefficient times the mean. City C has a high percentage of 
African Americans, calculated by multiplying the beta coefficient by the 75th percentile 
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value. City D has a low percentage of African Americans, calculated by multiplying the 
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Table 7: Cities With Varying Percentages of African Americans 
Table 7 suggests that there is a very small difference in foreclosure rates when the 
percentage of the population that is African American is allowed to vary. This is not 
surprising given that this variable is insignificant in the regression model. In general, the 
research literature does not support this finding, although there are a few exceptions.  
The effects of the housing stock’s age is assessed in Table 8. Each time frame, 
when allowed to vary, was calculated by multiplying the beta coefficient by the 75th 
percentile value. City E has a high portion of old housing stock. City F has a high portion 
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-1.05 -0.02 0.035 0.11 0.25 0.21 -0.08 1.054 1.66 
Table 8: Cities With Varying Housing Stock Ages 
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The results from this table match the results of the regression model and show that 
the newest housing stock should have the lowest foreclosure rate. This is inconsistent 
with prior findings in the literature.  
 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Although the foreclosure prediction model provides reasonably strong statistical 
results, there are unexpected findings. In particular, the insignificance of the regional 
variables is suspect and perhaps related to the choice of metropolitan areas as the unit of 
analysis. This analysis indicates that the type of foreclosure process is highly significant, 
and plays an important role in the determining foreclosure rates. The type of foreclosure 
process a city faces might be a source of vulnerability. Finally, the unemployment rate 
variable is highly significant, and explains variation in foreclosure rates. The significance 
of this variable is important because it provides justification for the use of employment 
rates as an instrumental variable in the economic health model, which is introduced in the 
next chapter.  
 
Endnotes 
                                                 





Chapter 5: The Economic Impact of Foreclosures 
This chapter explores the following research question: what are the economic 
implications of foreclosures for urban economies? This analysis is important because it 
shows how cities respond to foreclosures, and the results can help determine whether 
foreclosures are a stressor on urban economies. If the results suggest that foreclosures are 
a stressor, this will have implications for economic vulnerability and resiliency.  
THE VARIABLES USED IN THE ECONOMIC HEALTH MODEL  
As discussed earlier, the variables in this model were divided into four main 
categories: economic indicators (E), human capital variables (H), density related variable 
(D), and control variables (C). The table below presents the descriptive statistics for the 
variables used in the economic health model.  
 







Employmentrate 58.949 4.229084 49.6 69 N/A 
Fcrate 5.6898 2.961046 1.79 18.63 E 
StateGDP 622,798.8 583,744.5 51,585 1,958,904 E 
Manufactjobs 8.135 3.178983 1.7 17.8 E 
Manufvhightech 18.946 16.16166 1.5 74.6 E 
Exportvalue 10.469 13.67647 .9 79.8 E 
Exportprodjobs 37.928 53.12662 3.5 329 E 
Changemanufjobs -31.278 11.26166 -56 18.6 E 
Belowpovline 10.632 3.474638 5.4 31.5 H 
Bachelorsdegree 29.567 6.279035 14.3 47.3 H 
Somecollege 21.592 2.91283 15.5 27 H 
Highschoolgrad 27.513 4.722366 16.5 42.8 H 
Pop2011 1,690,938 1,706,868 166,136 9,516,047 D 
Popchange 138,252.5 242,116.9 -148,549 2,149,907 D 
Meantraveltime 24.57 3.057876 18.5 34.7 D 
Medincome 53,926.42 9,520.05 32,533 87,653 C 
DVHisp 0.2 .4020151 0 1 C 
AfricanAmer 12.923 10.07362 .5 47.9 C 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for the Economic Health Model  
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EXPECTED RESULTS 
It is expected that increasing foreclosure rates should have negative economic 
implications for urban economies. Foreclosed houses make minimal contributes to a 
city’s tax base, but still use public resources. They also cause nearby property values to 
drop, resulting in lower tax revenue. They may also create economic uncertainty, and will 
almost certainly create neighborhood instability in the form of vacant or abandoned 
properties.  
With the exception of the foreclosure rate variable, we would expect that the 
remaining variables in the economic indicator category would result in increased 
economic growth. State GDP is expected to increase economic growth because an MSA 
will be impacted by the state’s economic situation. If a state’s GDP is growing, we would 
expect an MSA to do the same. Both of the manufacturing variables would also be 
expected to increase economic growth. For some MSAs, manufacturing is a large source 
of employment, and can also help provide exports, both of which can stimulate economic 
growth.  
Within the human capital variables, all the education variables are expected to 
increase economic growth. Having an educated workforce across all levels increases 
economic growth, perhaps because a highly educated workforce increases innovation and 
productivity, and as the literature shows, these are two components critical for economic 
growth.  
In regards to the density category of variables, the two population variables are 
included primarily for control purposes, similar to the rationale in the foreclosure 
prediction model. The mean travel time variable is a measure of how many employment 
opportunities are realistically available to the MSA’s population. We would expect that 
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as the mean travel time increases, employment rates should also increase because the 
labor force has access to more employment opportunities.   
PRESENTATION OF THE ECONOMIC HEALTH MODEL  
The initial estimation of this model used an OLS regression with the percent of 
the population employed as the dependent variable. The results of the OLS regression 
model, without correcting for any potential OLS violations or simultaneity, are presented 










































pop2011 2.41 x 10-7 
 (0.84)
Popchange 1.11 x 10-6 
 (0.76)
Meantraveltime -0.253 
        (-1.70)










* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 10: Estimating Employment Rates Using OLS 
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Of particular importance is the fact that the foreclosure variable is significant in 
this model. This remains true regardless of whether the log of the foreclosure rate or 
foreclosure rate is used as an independent variable. The results from the table above 
suggest that foreclosures exert a downward pressure on employment rates.   
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, this model probably suffers from 
simultaneity, and using Ordinary Least Squares to estimate the regression will result in 
unreliable beta coefficients. Therefore, a system of equations was developed:  
 
1) Employmentrate = f(logforeclosurerate, stategdp, manufvhightech, 
changemanufjobs, belowpovline, bachelorsdegree, meantraveltime, hispanic) 
2) Logforeclosure = f(typeforeclosure, medincome, medincomewithmortgage, 
bachelorsdegree, medtaxrate, sq1949, sq1950, sq1970, sq1990) 
 
Equation 1 includes all significant variables from the OLS regression that explain 
economic growth. Equation 2 originates from and includes all variables that were 
statistically significant in foreclosure prediction model. The percent of the population that 
was unemployed, while statistically significant in the foreclosure prediction model, was 
not included in Equation 2 above to avoid correlation problems with the endogenous 
employment rate variable. Results from the Hausman Test suggest that simultaneity is 
present (see Appendix I). After verifying the identification requirements were met, 2SLS 
was used to estimate the regression. The full results of this model can be found in 
Appendix J.  
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DISCUSSION OF RESULTS FOR THE ECONOMIC HEALTH MODEL  
Using the output from the 2SLS regression mode, we can see that a one unit 
increase in the log of the foreclosure rate causes the percent of the population that is  
employed in an MSA to drop by 5.24 percent, holding all else constant. A one unit 
increase in the employment rate causes the log of the foreclosure rate to drop by 0.04 
percent. These relationships are as expected. They indicate that foreclosures have a 
negative impact on economic growth in a city. They also indicate that economic growth 
will decrease foreclosure rates.  
However, the signs on the state GDP and the percent of very high tech 
manufacturing jobs are incorrect. We would expect that both of these variables would 
increase employment rates. As mentioned earlier, a city’s economy does not operate in 
isolation from the state’s economy. Furthermore, high tech jobs should be a source of 
employment, given the high demand of these goods.  
The change in manufacturing jobs variable was calculated to be a negative 
number if the MSA lost jobs in this sector, and a positive number if the MSA gained jobs 
in manufacturing. Thus, the results tell us that a one percent increase in the 
manufacturing jobs in an MSA results in a 0.04 percent increase in employment rates. 
Manufacturing contributes to economic growth because assuming adequate demand, the 
goods created in the manufacturing sector can become a source of exports. Also, the 
manufacturing sector has high multipliers, meaning that it creates jobs in other sectors.  
Within the human capital variables, the relationship between the poverty variable 
and the bachelor’s degree variable are as expected. The poverty variable can be 
considered a proxy variable for socio-economic status, and the regression results show 
that as the poverty levels in a city increase, the employment rates will decrease. 
Supporting the results found in the literature, the bachelor’s degree variable shows that 
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education contributes to higher employment levels. It is surprising, however, that the 
other education variables are not statistically significant. This finding differs from the 
literature.  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
The economic health model establishes the mutual determination between 
foreclosure rates and economic growth and decline (measured by employment rates). The 
relationship between these two variables are as expected. Foreclosures represent a 
downward pressure on a city’s economy. Increased economic growth can cause 
foreclosure rates to drop. Other variables that have an impact on economic growth rates 
include the percent of manufacturing jobs considered high tech and the percent change in 
manufacturing jobs. The implications of these findings will be discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter.  
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Chapter 6: Explaining Foreclosures and Their Effect on Cities  
In addition to clarifying the factors that contribute to foreclosures, this report also 
attempts to explain the widely varying foreclosure rates in cities. Some cities, such the 
Bradenton-Sarasota-Venice, FL MSA experienced very high foreclosure rates. In 
contrast, cities such as the Austin-Round Rock, TX MSA did not. What specific factors 
account for these differences across MSAs?  Next, recognizing the complexity of urban 
economies, it is likely that the ramifications of increasing foreclosures are not contained 
in the housing market, and will spill-over into other sectors of the urban economy. This 
report examines the economic implications of foreclosures. How does a city’s economy 
respond to the pressures exerted by increasing foreclosure rates? The research literature 
generally, but not exclusively, tends to focus on the impacts of foreclosures within a 
single city. In contrast, this report takes a larger scope, and looks at the causes and 
economic impact of foreclosures in MSAs across the country. Finally, this report also 
explores what actions, if any, local authorities can take to mitigate the consequences of 
foreclosures.  
To fully explore these issues, a conceptual framework developed in Chapter 1 will 
be applied. First, the role of foreclosures as a stressor is examined. In addition to allowing 
us to better understand the inherent nature of foreclosures, the concept of a stressor 
allows for the introduction of two closely related concepts: vulnerability and resiliency. 
The empirical results of Chapter 5 confirm that foreclosures are a stressor on urban 
economies. Through the application of stressors, cities face increased vulnerability and 
decreased resiliency.  
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FORECLOSURES AS STRESSORS  
The results of the economic health model support the claim that foreclosures act 
as stressors at the MSA level. Foreclosures are statistically significant, and holding 
everything else constant, a one unit increase in the log of the foreclosure rate causes a 5.2 
percent decrease in employment rates. In this report, stressors are considered one of many 
factors that result in negative economic outcomes for cities. Foreclosures and the decline 
of the housing market both contributed to the economic recession, but there are other 
explanatory factors. For instance, a tightening credit market, the collapse of the financial 
sector, and lax governmental oversight and regulation also played a role.  
Would the recession have been as severe or prolonged had only foreclosures, and 
not these other compounding factors, been at work? While it is impossible to know with 
certainty the outcome of this counterfactual situation, it is possible to speculate. Modern 
city economies are highly complex and fragile. A downturn in the housing market would 
have ramifications in other sectors of the economy. This is especially true because the 
housing market decline was a prolonged process that occurred over an extended period of 
time. The housing market decline and increasing foreclosure rates resulted in a loss of 
wealth because the equity value of houses declined. Due to the loss of equity, there was 
less collateral and fewer financial resources are available for consumption and investment 
purposes. The consequences of this situation are twofold. Small businesses, which drive 
economies in some cities and are also sources of job creation, will lack assets to borrow 
money. This hinders the growth and proliferation of small businesses. Also, individual 
homeowners will be unable to sell their homes because they have negative equity. This 
means homeowners are locked into a specific labor market, and the labor force lacks 
mobility thereby reducing economic efficiency.   
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The reality of the recession is that numerous complex processes were at work and 
interacting with each other. The decline of the housing market interacted with other 
factors to cause an extremely severe recession. As the results of the economic health 
model indicate, factors such as a state’s GDP, the portion of manufacturing jobs 
considered high tech, poverty levels, and educational attainment levels can also cause 
economic growth or decline. Therefore, it is possible to consider the housing market’s 
decline, and the resulting surge in foreclosures a stressor that contributed to economic 
decline. In isolation, it is unlikely that foreclosures alone would have caused an economic 
downturn. But interacting with other factors, the conditions were just right for a severe 
economic downturn.  
ASSESSING ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY  
According to the results of the foreclosure prediction model, the type of 
foreclosure process in a state can have a large impact on the foreclosure rate. Previous 
research has shown that the judicial foreclosure process is lengthier. This additional time 
gives homeowners more opportunities to avoid going into foreclosure.   
There are a variety of initiatives, many established by the federal government, that 
allow a homeowner to avoid foreclosures. For instance, the Hope Now Alliance was 
established by the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) during the Bush administration. The main goal of this alliance, 
which included financial lenders, investors, housing counselors and loan servicers, is to 
reach out to distressed homeowners and help prevent foreclosures.1 Another federal 
program, the Making Homes Affordable program, also provide a variety of options for 
homeowners, such as lowering monthly mortgage payments, or, providing alternate 
solutions to foreclosures for those who no longer want to own a house.2 In 2009, the 
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Obama administration established the Home Affordable Modification Program, which 
helped with mortgage modifications, under the rationale that both homeowners and 
lenders benefit when a foreclosure is avoided.3 
Finally, recognizing that foreclosures impact the surrounding communities, the 
federal government created the Neighborhood Stabilization Program. This program 
provides grants to state and local communities with the goal of alleviating the negative 
societal repercussions stemming from foreclosures.4  
However, increasing the length of the foreclosure process causes increased 
economic uncertainty for homeowners and urban economies. There is increased 
economic uncertainty because the status of many houses is unclear, and increasing the 
length of the foreclosure process only increases this economic uncertainty. This economic 
uncertainty might hinder public spending, because city officials are uncertain about 
incoming real estate tax revenue, which is one of the main sources of revenue for a city. 
Homeowner spending would also likely be curtailed. Also, this economic uncertainty 
may cause the housing market to function improperly, resulting in housing market 
instability.  
Some might argue that one solution to preventing foreclosures, and thus 
decreasing a city’s economic vulnerability is to encourage states to adopt judicial 
foreclosure processes. However, city officials have limited influence over this policy 
decision. Cities and states have made some attempts to combat increasing foreclosure 
rates and thus decrease their vulnerability. Some states have developed legislation to 
address high cost loans, and have created statewide consumer education campaigns and 
hotlines for homeowners.5 In a more extreme example, California’s San Bernardino 
county is considering using eminent domain to seize houses that are underwater, and then 
sell the houses to investment banks, who would allow homeowners to lower their 
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monthly mortgage payment, and avoid losing their home.6 But given the scope and 
severity of the housing market decline, it is unlikely that these efforts will be adequate, 
and to some extent a city’s vulnerability to foreclosures and the housing market decline is 
beyond its control.  
Cities and states are dependent on the actions of the federal government. Housing 
finance is mostly legislated and regulated at the national level, and this centralization of 
government powers can be a source of increased vulnerability for cities. Given the 
regulatory structure of the mortgage market, decentralizing mortgage regulatory 
responsibilities to subnational governments is an infeasible and unrealistic approach that 
would likely create more disorder and problems than it solves. As was the case in the 
1990s housing market crisis, decentralizing regulatory authority to states can be 
problematic especially if state governments lack the necessary regulatory policy levers. 
Due to the regulatory structure of housing finance, and the concentration of federal 
powers at the regulatory level, city officials have limited authority and capacity to 
undertake measures to mitigate the negative implications of high foreclosure rates.  
Thusfar, this chapter has established that foreclosures are a stressor that exert 
downward pressure on urban economies. Due to the application of the stressor, cities face 
increased vulnerability when foreclosure rates are high. Cities also have limited resiliency 
because oftentimes local authorities do not have the policy levers that can affect 
foreclosure rates in a city.  
DEVELOPING ECONOMIC RESILIENCYv   
Given the limited options local authorities have to address rising foreclosure rates, 
how can cities maintain or develop economic resiliency and competitiveness in the 
                                                 
v The facts in this subsection regarding Pittsburgh and its economy were taken from a paper written during 
the 2011-2012 academic year.  
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context of stressors such as foreclosures? Empirical results from the second structural 
equation in the economic health model suggest that increasing economic growth can 
result in decreased foreclosure rates. A one percentage point increase in employment 
rates results in a 0.03 unit decrease in the log of the foreclosure rate. This section assesses 
three alternative mechanisms to enhancing economic growth: attracting industries with 
high multipliers, developing a specialization, and avoiding public policy decisions that 
create path dependency.  
The empirical results from the economic health model show that high tech 
manufacturing jobs result in decreasing employment levels. However, this result is not 
supported by the literature, and generally manufacturing is a driver of economic growth. 
This should be especially true for high tech manufacturing. Manufacturing is a large 
source of exports, and as established earlier by the economic base theory, exports are a 
source of economic growth. The manufacturing sector tends to pay high wages, which 
has multiplier effects in the local economy. A multiplier is a measurement that 
determines the linkages and impact of an industry on other sectors of the economy. For 
every 100 jobs in the manufacturing sector, 2.91 jobs are created elsewhere in the 
economy.7 In comparison, every 100 jobs in the business services and retail trade sectors 
create 1.54 and 0.88 jobs respectively.8 The variable that measures the percent change in 
manufacturing jobs between 2000 and 2010 support these findings in the literature. This 
variable suggests that a one percent increase in manufacturing jobs between 2000 and 
2010 results in a 0.04 percent increase in employment rates, indicating that 
manufacturing jobs are a source of economic growth.  
  Given that manufacturing jobs have positive economic impacts, perhaps cities 
should attempt to lure manufacturing companies to their city in order to promote 
economic growth. Some strategies involve providing financial or other types of 
 67
incentives for companies to open branches within a city or nurturing a labor force that 
attracts the manufacturing sector. However, not all cities can successfully implement 
these strategies. In addition, if city officials focus exclusively on attracting industries with 
high multipliers, they risk attaining a specialization in this sector.  
Although beyond the scope of the empirical analyses presented here, a commonly 
accepted view in the literature is that extremely high specialization levels can be 
problematic. Specialization in one sector means that a city may have to import goods 
from other sectors, and a high dependency on imports from other regions may be another 
source of vulnerability. Also, elasticity of demand from regions beyond the city will 
determine the magnitude of demand for exported goods. Should external demand 
decrease, the region specializing in the exported good will suffer economically.  
In an increasingly globalized world, global competition results in increased 
competition to dominate the export market. Detroit, for example, specialized in 
automobile manufacturing. As foreign competitors gained more of the market share, and 
demand for domestically produced automobiles dropped, Detroit’s economy suffered 
tremendously. 
Some of the cities that suffered the most from foreclosures, such as Phoenix, AZ 
and Las Vegas, NV had economies that relied very substantially on population growth 
and, therefore, specialized in the housing industry. At the peak of the housing bubble, 
more than 25 percent of the economies of Phoenix and Las Vegas were concentrated 
around the real estate, housing and construction industries; in essence, housing was the 
center of these urban economies.9 As the populations of these cities grew, city 
governments saw increased revenue levels, and public spending soared. But housing is 
not a particularly resilient industry, and when the housing bubble burst, not only did the 
housing industry collapse, but all related industries also collapsed. In addition to the 
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housing decline, the economic decline eroded many retirees savings, and the city began 
operating on a deficit.10 Thus, if foreclosures are stressing a city’s economy, sufficient 
economic diversification may help decrease economic vulnerability and increase 
resiliency. However, adequate economic diversification makes agglomeration economies, 
which the literature has shown to be a source of economic growth, harder to attain.  
Perhaps one option to ensuring economic resiliency and developing economic 
competitiveness is to avoid establishing a path dependency that locks a city into a 
situation that produces poor long term results. As defined in Chapter 1, path dependence 
is a series of cumulative decisions that force a system down one path or another, thus 
making the system’s future more predictable.11 However, it should be noted that in some 
instances, path dependence can cause positive outcomes. But this was not the case in 
Pittsburgh, PA. Pittsburgh’s economy historically specialized around the steel industry. 
In the early 1970s, with the deindustrialization of the US and the rise of more efficient 
steel producers abroad, the steel industry in the US collapsed. The devastation from the 
collapse of the steel industry was immense. Unemployment rates in the region reached 
over 18 percent, and over 200,000 were unemployed.12 
After the collapse of the steel industry, local authorities attempted to orient the 
economy around the service sector, resulting in large law firms, architecture companies, 
financial firms, and other industries concentrating in the area. Today, eight Fortune Five 
Hundred companies are located in Pittsburgh.13 The region also attracts entrepreneurs 
through programs such as Innovation Works, which was designed to lure start-up 
companies to the area by providing financial support.14  
City officials also strategically diversified the city’s economy. Drawing on the 
strengths of Carnegie Mellon University and the University of Pittsburgh, the city began 
to attract technology firms such as Google, Microsoft, and Intel. The medical sector has 
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also become a driving economic force in the region, and it is possible to speculate that 
local public policy decisions have helped foster the higher education and medical sectors, 
and these sectors are known to cause economic growth.  
Although these strategies will not impact foreclosure rates in cities, they may 
result in increased economic growth. As suggested by the results of the economic health 
model, increased economic growth will reduce foreclosure rates, and perhaps these 
strategies could mitigate some of the negative economic ramifications stemming from 
foreclosures.  
CONCLUSION AND AREAS OF FURTHER EXPLORATION 
The main goal of this report was to clarify the nature of foreclosures and explore 
their economic impacts. In order to do so, two empirical models were used. To explore 
these complex concepts in a manageable way, a conceptual framework consisting of 
stressors, vulnerability, and resiliency was developed. The application of a stressor such 
as a foreclosure can cause urban economies to experience increased vulnerability.  
The results from the empirical analysis suggest that the foreclosure process in a 
state impacts the foreclosure rate. In addition, foreclosures exert a downward economic 
pressure on urban economies, as evidenced by the results of the economic health model. 
This regression analysis also finds that increased economic growth can result in 
decreased foreclosure rates. To a large extent, local authorities have limited policy levers 
that could affect foreclosure rates. The regulatory structure is based at the national level, 
and this is a source of vulnerability for cities. Given that the foreclosure rate is beyond 
the control of local officials, the remainder of the report looks at alternative options to 
increase economic resiliency and maintain or develop economic competitiveness.  
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The empirical analysis explores the causes of foreclosures in the 100 largest 
MSAs. A closely related question is to consider how cities with different economic 
structures respond to foreclosures. For instance, are the causes of foreclosures different in 
a city whose economy is centered around public administration (for instance a city that is 
a state capital) compared to an industry-oriented city? Ideally, any analysis that explores 
the causes of foreclosures would include a measurement of the percentage of subprime 
mortgages issued, but this variable is difficult to obtain, especially at the level of an 
MSA.  
Adding a time dimension to this analysis would also be helpful. An ideal time 
frame is one that encompasses a period of economic growth, economic decline, and 
economic stagnation. The impact of foreclosures could be compared during these three 
time frames, and this would help clarify the role of foreclosures as a stressor.  
Throughout this report, an MSA is the primary unit of analysis. The drawback to 
this approach is that an MSA, by definition, will include both a city center and in most 
instances, the surrounding suburbs. While it is appropriate to assume that an MSA is 
composed primarily of urbanized areas, there are alternative approaches that would allow 
an empirical analysis to focus more directly on cities. By selecting census tracts that are 
only within the city boundaries, and excluding those that are not, it would be possible to 
focus on the primary area of interest, a city.  
A final approach that would allow for the option of focusing more directly on the 
cities is to use a case study approach. This approach is advantageous because it would 
allow for a less theoretical approach and would provide a realistic opportunity to evaluate 
the conceptual theories behind economic growth. A case study approach would 
incorporate city-specific efforts that are underway to develop economic resiliency, and 
would capture idiosyncratic features that empirical analyses do not.  
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 The economic resiliency and competitiveness of a city is important because cities 
are drivers of national economic growth. The performance of a city’s economy will have 
direct implications for regional and national economies. Stressors such as foreclosures 
can have negative economic implications for urban economies. Cities with resilient and 
competitive economies are likely to foster economic prosperity, on both a regional and 
national level.  
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APPENDIX A: BEA REGIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS AND AVERAGE FORECLOSURE RATES 
New England Region (Region 1; Average Foreclosure Rate: 5.19 percent) 
Connecticut New Hampshire 
Maine Rhode Island 
Massachusetts Vermont 
Mideast Region (Region 2; Average Foreclosure Rate: 5.48 percent) 
Delaware New Jersey 
District of Columbia New York 
Maryland Pennsylvania 




Plains Region (Region 4; Average Foreclosure Rate: 3.37 percent) 
Iowa Nebraska 
Kansas North Dakota 
Minnesota South Dakota 
Missouri  
Southeast Region (Region 5; Average Foreclosure Rate: 7.18 percent) 
Alabama Mississippi 
Arkansas North Carolina 




Louisiana West Virginia 
Southwest Region (Region 6; Average Foreclosure Rate: 3.87 percent) 
Arizona Oklahoma 
New Mexico Texas 

























0 5 10 15
Fitted values
 76 
APPENDIX C: RESULTS OF THE FORECLOSURE PREDICTION MODEL (SATURATED 
VERSION)  
reg logfcrate dvreg1 dvreg2 dvreg3 dvreg5 dvreg6 dvreg7 dvreg8 typefc unemployed 
belowpovline medincome medincomewithmort africanamer dvhisp bachelorsdegree rooms 
housevaluewithmort medhousecost sq1949 sq1950 sq1970 sq1990 medtaxrate pop2011 popchange, 
robust 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     100 
                                                       F( 25,    74) =   11.27 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.7409 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .10457 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                   |               Robust 
         logfcrate |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            dvreg1 |   .0841691   .0863829     0.97   0.333    -.0879526    .2562908 
            dvreg2 |   .0220199   .0833975     0.26   0.792    -.1441533    .1881931 
            dvreg3 |    .076225   .0630519     1.21   0.231    -.0494085    .2018586 
            dvreg5 |   .0724559   .0648904     1.12   0.268    -.0568411     .201753 
            dvreg6 |  -.1004089   .0742117    -1.35   0.180    -.2482789    .0474611 
            dvreg7 |   .0703577   .0759606     0.93   0.357    -.0809971    .2217126 
            dvreg8 |   .0212913   .0786632     0.27   0.787    -.1354486    .1780312 
            typefc |   .1381961   .0340024     4.06   0.000     .0704449    .2059473 
        unemployed |   .0248605   .0118133     2.10   0.039     .0013219    .0483991 
      belowpovline |  -.0030794   .0064118    -0.48   0.632    -.0158552    .0096964 
         medincome |   .0000215   7.54e-06     2.85   0.006     6.48e-06    .0000365 
 medincomewithmort |  -.0000201   5.33e-06    -3.78   0.000    -.0000308   -9.53e-06 
       africanamer |   .0028561   .0021323     1.34   0.185    -.0013926    .0071049 
            dvhisp |  -.0417178   .0443833    -0.94   0.350    -.1301535    .0467179 
   bachelorsdegree |   -.009736   .0043813    -2.22   0.029     -.018466    -.001006 
             rooms |  -.1531203   .0802244    -1.91   0.060    -.3129709    .0067302 
housevaluewithmort |   2.70e-07   3.55e-07     0.76   0.449    -4.38e-07    9.79e-07 
      medhousecost |  -4.68e-07   6.44e-07    -0.73   0.470    -1.75e-06    8.16e-07 
            sq1949 |   .0001739    .000074     2.35   0.022     .0000264    .0003214 
            sq1950 |   .0002022   .0000994     2.03   0.045     4.18e-06    .0004002 
            sq1970 |   .0001964   .0000651     3.02   0.003     .0000668    .0003261 
            sq1990 |   .0001042   .0000456     2.29   0.025     .0000134     .000195 
        medtaxrate |   .0000494   .0000214     2.31   0.024     6.72e-06    .0000921 
           pop2011 |   1.04e-08   7.46e-09     1.39   0.169    -4.50e-09    2.52e-08 
         popchange |   2.61e-08   3.21e-08     0.81   0.419    -3.78e-08    8.99e-08 





APPENDIX D: STATISTICAL SOUNDNESS OF THE FORECLOSURE PREDICTION MODEL 
(SATURATED VERSION)  
In order to use a regression model for analytical purposes, it must be statistically 
sound. In this model, there is reason to suspect heteroskedasticity. The data is cross-
sectional, and includes potentially heterogeneous observations (MSAs within the same 
country). In order to correct for heteroskedasticity, residual plots were examined to detect 
patterns. Apart from the dependent variable, the residual plots for all other variables 
showed white noise, indicating that the error’s variance is constant. Furthermore, the log 
transformation of the dependent variable means that its scale is reduced by a power of 
ten. This helps lower heteroskedasticity. Estimate the regressions using White’s robust 
standard errors also helps correct for the presence of heteroskedasticity.  
Because the data are not time series, autocorrelation is not expected to be a 
problem. Any correlation between the error terms is more likely to be spatial 
autocorrelation, resulting from the fact that cities located near each other are more likely 
to be similar as opposed to cities located far away from each other. The Durbin Watson 
statistic for this model is 1.97, suggesting that serial and spatial autocorrelation are not 
present.  
Multicollinearity occurs when independent variables are correlated with each 
other, and can be detected with a Variance Inflation Test. If the VIF is larger than 10, 
there is reason to suspect multicollinearity between two or more variables. In this case, 
the only two variables with VIF statistics substantially greater than 10 are the medincome 
and medincomewithmort variables (see below). These two variables measure the median 
income for those in an MSA with a mortgage and the overall median income in an MSA, 
so it is not surprising that they are closely correlated with each other. However, both 
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variables are statistically significant, meaning that they both working independently to 




Variable VIF 1/VIF 
medincome 55.18 0.018122 
medincomewithmort 53.39 0.018731 
housevaluewithmort 11.89 0.084088 
sq1949 11.70 0.085474 
dvreg8 9.05 0.110440 
dvreg5 8.56 0.116857 
sq1990 7.80 0.128208 
sq1970 7.58 0.131926 
bachelorsdegree 6.27 0.159483 
dvreg2 5.88 0.170126 
dvreg6 5.76 0.173583 
rooms 5.70 0.175480 
medtaxrate 5.56 0.179849 
sq1950 5.49 0.182306 
belowpovline 4.89 0.204463 
dvreg1 4.24 0.235919 
dvhisp 4.05 0.247001 
dvreg3 4.04 0.247757 
africanamer 3.57 0.280482 
dvreg7 2.47 0.405577 
unemployed 2.30 0.434723 
typefc 2.18 0.457836 
pop2011 2.06 0.485341 
popchange 1.62 0.617629 
medhousecost 1.31 0.763021 




APPENDIX E: DETERMINING REGIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS FOR MSAS   
A variety of strategies were employed to determine accurate regional groupings of 
the MSAs in the sample. First, a restricted least squares test was conducted. The purpose 
of this test is to determine whether two coefficients are statistically equal. The results of 
the test would indicate a statistically significant difference between the various regional 
groups. Numerous restricted least squares tests were conducted to compare different 
regions, and none of the calculated test statistics were significant. This suggests that there 
is no statistical difference between these regional groups, and for some reason, the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis method of classifying states does not contribute to 
explaining variation in foreclosure rates, and is not meaningful for the purposes of this 
analysis.  
Second, different methods of categorizing were explored, primarily categorizing 
cities on the basis of median income level in an MSA, state unemployment rates, and 
state GDP levels. Within each category, numerous breakdowns were attempted. 
Estimation of multiple regressions with these different categories did not result in the 
statistical significance of the regional variables.   
The final attempt to make the regional dummy variables significant involved an 
extension of the spatial submarket theory. This theory is typically applied within an 
individual city, and allows for the possibility that characteristics vary across space. By 
adding a geographical dimension, this theory allows for the fact that two neighborhoods 
within a single city located adjacent to each are more likely to be similar when compared 
to two neighborhoods at opposite ends of the city. These similarities suggest that spatial 
submarkets exist within a city.vi To control for these submarkets, researchers includes 
                                                 
vi Daniel Immergluck and Geoff Smith, “The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of Single-Family 
Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values,” Housing Policy Debate 17, no. 1 (2006): 68. 
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five variables in their regression model: longitude, latitude, each of these variable 
squared, and the product of the longitude and latitude. Most often, these variables are 
significant, suggesting that spatial submarkets exist within a city. Extending this logic, it 
is very likely that geographical spatial submarkets exist within the U.S. But these five 
additional variables were insignificant in this analysis, indicating that within this sample, 




APPENDIX F: RESULTS OF THE FORECLOSURE PREDICTION MODEL (UNSATURATED 
VERSION)  
reg logfcrate typefc unemployed medincome medincomewithmort africanamer dvhisp 
bachelorsdegree sq1949 sq1950 sq1970 sq1990 medtaxrate, robust 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     100 
                                                       F( 12,    87) =   12.17 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6256 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .11592 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |               Robust 
        logfcrate |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           typefc |   .1426661   .0311052     4.59   0.000      .080841    .2044911 
       unemployed |   .0411481   .0103658     3.97   0.000      .020545    .0617512 
        medincome |   .0000158   5.53e-06     2.85   0.005     4.78e-06    .0000268 
medincomewithmort |  -.0000134   4.36e-06    -3.06   0.003     -.000022   -4.69e-06 
      africanamer |   .0027413   .0013917     1.97   0.052    -.0000249    .0055074 
           dvhisp |  -.1209239    .049173    -2.46   0.016    -.2186605   -.0231873 
  bachelorsdegree |  -.0089774    .004622    -1.94   0.055    -.0181642    .0002095 
           sq1949 |   .0002415   .0000571     4.23   0.000     .0001281     .000355 
           sq1950 |    .000339   .0000953     3.56   0.001     .0001497    .0005284 
           sq1970 |   .0003439   .0000673     5.11   0.000     .0002102    .0004776 
           sq1990 |   .0001668   .0000459     3.64   0.000     .0000756     .000258 
       medtaxrate |    .000054    .000017     3.17   0.002     .0000202    .0000879 






APPENDIX G: STATISTICAL SOUNDNESS OF THE FORECLOSURE 
PREDICTION MODEL (UNSATURATED VERSION)  
On the basis of examining residual plots, heteroskedasticity is not expected to be a 
problem in this model. Using White’s Robust Standard Errors helps eliminate any 
heteroskedasticity that might be present. Autocorrelation is also not expected to be a 
major issue, and the calculated Durbin Watson statistic is 1.91, meaning that 
autocorrelation is not present. The Variance Inflation Factor results below show that 
similar to the saturated model, the two median income variables are highly correlated 
with each other. However, this is also not a large source of concern.  
 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Medincomewithmort 25.75 0.038833 
Medincome 19.72 0.050702 
sq1949 6.69 0.149586 
sq1990 5.82 0.171834 
sq1970 4.03 0.248079 
Medtaxrate 3.99 0.250534 
Sq1950 3.99 0.250701 
Bachelorsdegree 3.87 0.258104 
Dvhisp 2.51 0.398633 
Typefc 1.66 0.600932 
Africanamer 1.42 0.705842 
Unemployed 1.35 0.743045 
Mean VIF 6.73  
  
 83 
APPENDIX H: THE ECONOMIC HEALTH MODEL USING OLS  
reg employmentratepercent logforeclosurerate stategdp manufjobs manufvhightech 
exportvalue exportprodjobs changemanufjobs belowpovline bachelorsdegree somecollege 
highschoolgrad pop2011 popchange meantraveltime medincome hispanic africanamer 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     100 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 17,    82) =   12.28 
       Model |  1271.21924    17  74.7776025           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  499.410738    82  6.09037486           R-squared     =  0.7179 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6595 
       Total |  1770.62998    99  17.8851513           Root MSE      =  2.4679 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
employmentratepe~t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
logforeclosurerate |  -4.658721   1.765279    -2.64   0.010    -8.170424   -1.147018 
          stategdp |  -2.28e-06   6.57e-07    -3.47   0.001    -3.58e-06   -9.70e-07 
         manufjobs |    .012751   .1058963     0.12   0.904    -.1979105    .2234126 
    manufvhightech |  -.0652492    .022491    -2.90   0.005    -.1099909   -.0205075 
       exportvalue |   .0653637   .1113084     0.59   0.559    -.1560641    .2867916 
    exportprodjobs |  -.0149128   .0278158    -0.54   0.593    -.0702473    .0404217 
   changemanufjobs |   .0548225   .0260642     2.10   0.038     .0029724    .1066726 
      belowpovline |  -.4470399   .2008323    -2.23   0.029    -.8465593   -.0475205 
   bachelorsdegree |   .4508297   .1660595     2.71   0.008     .1204844    .7811749 
       somecollege |    .064035   .1711123     0.37   0.709    -.2763619     .404432 
    highschoolgrad |   .1195952   .1806049     0.66   0.510    -.2396856     .478876 
           pop2011 |   2.41e-07   2.95e-07     0.82   0.417    -3.46e-07    8.29e-07 
         popchange |   1.11e-06   1.15e-06     0.97   0.336    -1.17e-06    3.39e-06 
    meantraveltime |  -.3009949   .1474838    -2.04   0.044    -.5943872   -.0076025 
         medincome |   .0000109   .0000692     0.16   0.875    -.0001268    .0001487 
          hispanic |   .1087698    .042375     2.57   0.012     .0244724    .1930672 
       africanamer |   .0002566   .0384738     0.01   0.995    -.0762799    .0767932 




APPENDIX I: HAUSMAN TEST FOR SIMULTANEITY  
reg employmentratepercent logforeclosurerate stategdp manufvhightech changemanufjobs 
belowpovline bachelorsdegree meantraveltime hispanic, robust 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     100 
                                                       F(  8,    91) =   37.92 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6992 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.4193 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                   |               Robust 
employmentratepe~t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
logforeclosurerate |  -4.801436   2.229654    -2.15   0.034    -9.230371   -.3725016 
          stategdp |  -2.36e-06   5.37e-07    -4.40   0.000    -3.43e-06   -1.29e-06 
    manufvhightech |  -.0639791   .0257148    -2.49   0.015    -.1150584   -.0128998 
   changemanufjobs |   .0483205   .0226141     2.14   0.035     .0034003    .0932407 
      belowpovline |  -.4823544     .13726    -3.51   0.001    -.7550046   -.2097042 
   bachelorsdegree |   .3887517   .0624524     6.22   0.000     .2646977    .5128058 
    meantraveltime |  -.1860885     .09653    -1.93   0.057    -.3778334    .0056565 
          hispanic |   .0949224   .0323908     2.93   0.004     .0305821    .1592626 
             _cons |   63.27691   3.132689    20.20   0.000     57.05421    69.49961 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. predict employmentrate_res, res 
 
. reg logforeclosurerate  employmentratepercent stategdp manufvhightech changemanufjobs 
belowpovline bachelorsdegree meantraveltime hispanic employmentrate_res , robust 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     100 
                                                       F(  3,    90) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  1.0000 
                                                       Root MSE      =       0 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      |               Robust 
   logforeclosurerate |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
employmentratepercent |   -.208271   2.30e-09 -9.0e+07   0.000     -.208271    -.208271 
             stategdp |  -4.92e-07   5.94e-15 -8.3e+07   0.000    -4.92e-07   -4.92e-07 
       manufvhightech |   -.013325   2.08e-10 -6.4e+07   0.000     -.013325    -.013325 
      changemanufjobs |   .0100638   1.60e-10  6.3e+07   0.000     .0100638    .0100638 
         belowpovline |  -.1004604   1.42e-09 -7.1e+07   0.000    -.1004604   -.1004604 
      bachelorsdegree |   .0809657   1.05e-09  7.7e+07   0.000     .0809657    .0809657 
       meantraveltime |  -.0387568   8.33e-10 -4.7e+07   0.000    -.0387568   -.0387568 
             hispanic |   .0197696   2.82e-10  7.0e+07   0.000     .0197696    .0197696 
   employmentrate_res |    .208271   2.12e-09  9.8e+07   0.000      .208271     .208271 




APPENDIX J: THE ECONOMIC HEALTH MODEL USING 2SLS   
reg3 (employmentratepercent logforeclosurerate stategdp manufvhightech changemanufjobs 
belowpovline bachelorsdegree meantraveltime hispanic) ( logforeclosurerate 
employmentratepercent typeforeclosure medincome medincomewithmort bachelorsdegree 





      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     100 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 15,    84) =   20.02 
       Model |   1383.5409    15  92.2360599           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  387.089082    84  4.60820336           R-squared     =  0.7814 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7423 
       Total |  1770.62998    99  17.8851513           Root MSE      =  2.1467 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
employmentratep~t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         stategdp |  -1.52e-06   5.47e-07    -2.77   0.007    -2.60e-06   -4.28e-07 
   manufvhightech |  -.0421715   .0180282    -2.34   0.022    -.0780225   -.0063204 
  changemanufjobs |   .0333116   .0237813     1.40   0.165    -.0139801    .0806034 
     belowpovline |  -.5682157   .1598407    -3.55   0.001    -.8860765   -.2503548 
  bachelorsdegree |    .388631   .0838255     4.64   0.000     .2219349    .5553271 
   meantraveltime |  -.2588187   .0923603    -2.80   0.006    -.4424873   -.0751501 
         hispanic |   .1334008   .0279463     4.77   0.000     .0778265     .188975 
  typeforeclosure |   .6311525   .5588031     1.13   0.262    -.4800888    1.742394 
        medincome |  -.0000101   .0001225    -0.08   0.935    -.0002536    .0002335 
medincomewithmort |    .000046   .0000906     0.51   0.613    -.0001342    .0002261 
       medtaxrate |  -.0002881   .0003858    -0.75   0.457    -.0010553    .0004791 
           sq1949 |  -.0043146   .0011242    -3.84   0.000    -.0065502    -.002079 
           sq1950 |   -.006964   .0017807    -3.91   0.000     -.010505   -.0034229 
           sq1970 |  -.0071377   .0012178    -5.86   0.000    -.0095594   -.0047159 
           sq1990 |  -.0018661   .0007226    -2.58   0.012    -.0033029   -.0004292 
            _cons |   72.26619   4.866929    14.85   0.000     62.58777    81.94461 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     100 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 15,    84) =    9.24 
       Model |  1.94451297    15  .129634198           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1.17789774    84  .014022592           R-squared     =  0.6228 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5554 
       Total |   3.1224107    99  .031539502           Root MSE      =  .11842 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
logforeclosurer~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         stategdp |   1.71e-08   3.02e-08     0.57   0.572    -4.29e-08    7.71e-08 
   manufvhightech |  -.0000712   .0009945    -0.07   0.943    -.0020489    .0019064 
  changemanufjobs |   .0006483   .0013118     0.49   0.622    -.0019604    .0032571 
     belowpovline |   .0070348   .0088173     0.80   0.427    -.0104994     .024569 
  bachelorsdegree |  -.0080424   .0046241    -1.74   0.086    -.0172379    .0011531 
   meantraveltime |    .025023   .0050949     4.91   0.000     .0148913    .0351548 
         hispanic |  -.0046091   .0015416    -2.99   0.004    -.0076747   -.0015434 
  typeforeclosure |   .1254483   .0308253     4.07   0.000     .0641488    .1867477 
        medincome |   .0000123   6.76e-06     1.83   0.071    -1.10e-06    .0000258 
medincomewithmort |  -.0000148   5.00e-06    -2.96   0.004    -.0000247   -4.87e-06 
       medtaxrate |   .0000488   .0000213     2.29   0.024     6.49e-06    .0000911 
           sq1949 |   .0002196    .000062     3.54   0.001     .0000963    .0003429 
           sq1950 |   .0004056   .0000982     4.13   0.000     .0002103     .000601 
           sq1970 |   .0003075   .0000672     4.58   0.000     .0001739    .0004411 
           sq1990 |   .0001693   .0000399     4.25   0.000       .00009    .0002486 




Two-stage least-squares regression 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Equation          Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"     F-Stat        P 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
employment~t      100      8    2.420299    0.6989      25.93   0.0000 




                      |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
employmentratepercent | 
   logforeclosurerate |  -5.244022   2.408568    -2.18   0.031    -9.996683   -.4913613 
             stategdp |  -2.36e-06   5.17e-07    -4.56   0.000    -3.38e-06   -1.34e-06 
       manufvhightech |  -.0632355   .0195475    -3.23   0.001    -.1018071   -.0246639 
      changemanufjobs |    .047574   .0228682     2.08   0.039     .0024497    .0926984 
         belowpovline |  -.4842228   .1316343    -3.68   0.000    -.7439677   -.2244779 
      bachelorsdegree |   .3799105   .0776435     4.89   0.000     .2267019    .5331191 
       meantraveltime |  -.1772184   .1017793    -1.74   0.083    -.3780524    .0236155 
             hispanic |   .0935235   .0266839     3.50   0.001     .0408699     .146177 
                _cons |   63.64024    3.79891    16.75   0.000     56.14411    71.13637 
----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
logforeclosurerate    | 
employmentratepercent |  -.0362188   .0098416    -3.68   0.000    -.0556385   -.0167991 
      typeforeclosure |    .176688   .0331529     5.33   0.000     .1112696    .2421063 
            medincome |   .0000191   6.31e-06     3.03   0.003     6.65e-06    .0000315 
    medincomewithmort |  -.0000127   4.83e-06    -2.64   0.009    -.0000223   -3.20e-06 
      bachelorsdegree |   .0048814   .0052648     0.93   0.355    -.0055072      .01527 
           medtaxrate |   .0000148    .000019     0.78   0.435    -.0000226    .0000522 
               sq1949 |   .0000579   .0000777     0.75   0.457    -.0000954    .0002113 
               sq1950 |   .0000388   .0001311     0.30   0.767    -.0002199    .0002976 
               sq1970 |   .0000121   .0000937     0.13   0.897    -.0001728     .000197 
               sq1990 |   .0000766   .0000474     1.62   0.108     -.000017    .0001701 
                _cons |   2.425051   .6041401     4.01   0.000     1.232943    3.617159 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Endogenous variables:  employmentratepercent logforeclosurerate  
Exogenous variables:   stategdp manufvhightech changemanufjobs belowpovline  
     bachelorsdegree meantraveltime hispanic typeforeclosure medincome  
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